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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Treatise of Human Naturel stands as an important 
da te in the history of epistemology. For many, David Hume, 
even more than Descartes, represents modern philosophy at the 
cross roads. Some believe that Hume symbolizes the suicide of 
sensationalism and that his work has lead to a crude and dubj 
empiricism. Others regard Hume as the intellectual revolutio . ~ 
and pioneer spirit who first had the courage to sever the ties 
whi ch bound all previous philosophy to the philosoPh1a perennis. 
For these, the work of Hume is not an epilogue appended to the 
story of Locke and Berkeley, but a prologue to the drama of 
modern philosophy. 
One and all admit the immense influence of the 
Scottish philosopher. Despite many obituary notices and more 
than a century marked by the dominance of German idealism, 
empiricism of the Humean stamp is very much alive today. "Not 
merely Kant with his idealism and Reid with his realism but also 
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. 
Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1946. Hereafter the Treatise will be 
referred to by the letter ~. 
1 
pragmatism and contemporary logical positivism--not an insignifi-
cant progeny--find in Hu..rne a progenitor.,,2 
The Treatise is itself the classical statement of the 
empiricist philosophy. Cons~quently, in the age of Absolute 
Ideali sm, it was the duty of all self-respecting philosophers 
to refute Hume. Today, in an era of the dominance of a positiv- I 
ism conceived in the spirit of Hume, Hume is revered as a Found~ 
ing Father, the precursor of positivism, and his works are 
consulted as a wellspring of wisdom. 
~ecause of this profound influence, Hume cannot be by-
passed by the serious student of the history of philosophy. The 
challenge he represents must be met, and a carefully reasoned 
assent or disapproval recorded. Although a remarkable number of 
books appears regularly on Hume, his importance is sufficient to 
merit another study, especially since the author of this thesis 
is not in full accord with the present trend of Humean interpre-
tation. 
T. H. Green3 and Leslie Stephen4 exemplify a strong 
2 B. M. Laing, "Great Thinkers: David Hume," 
Philosophy, London, XII, October, 1937, 412. 
3 T. H. Green, Introduction to Burne's Treatise gl 
Human Nature, in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. 
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1898, I, 1-297. 
4 Leslie Stephen, English Thought In ~ Eighteenth 
Century, 2nd ed., 2 vo1s., London, 1881. 
I, 
3 
and traditional interpretation of Hume which asserts that Hurne's 
phi losophy is chiefly negative and that Hume merely reduces 
the principles of Locke and Berkeley to their logical--and 
absurd--conclusion. For them, Hume has contributed nothing 
positive to philosophy, but has merely inserted within it a 
debunking attitude. The tradition has its origin in the writing 
of Re id,5 Beattie, and Huxley. Both Reid and Beattie were quick 
t o read Hume's work as a final chapter in the story of Locke and 
Berkeley. 
Today, this traditional mode of interpretation is ver~ 
much out of favor.. The modern who is at one with HUlDe on a 
number of essentials does not like to hear his position described 
as "absurdity." Ralph V. Church contends that Hume's main con-
clusions on causality are independent of his chief psychological 
dogmas. Church insists that an 1nterpretation in the pattern 
of Reid: 
misses not only the actual conclusion of Hume's critical 
analysis ot causation, but also his arguments to that con-
clusion from the impotence of apagogic reasoning in the 
matter, as well as the analytic efficacy of the further 
prinCiple that what is distinguishable is separable; in 6 
effect, the substance of Hume's position in this regard. 
From a somewhat different viewpoint, N. Kemp Smith 
5 Thomas Reld, InquirY In12. the Human Mind, I, in 
wor~s, Preface and notes by Sir William Hamilton, .Edlnburgh, 
184, 102-103. 
6 Hume's Theory of the Understanding, London, 1935, 
203. 
alSO att~sts the inadequacy of the Reid-Beattie interpretation. 
Smith's thesis is that Hume entered philosophy through the gate~ 
way of morals and under the influence of Frances Hutcheson, and 
that the central contention of Hume is that reason must be the 
servant of the passions. 7 Other writers of today, who, though 
they may not accept the writings of Church and Smith in detail, 
fall within the general pattern, are: MacNabb, Maund, Jessop, 
Hobart, and H. H. Pr1ce. 8 
This thesis will concentrate on Hume's doctrine of 
causality. The main purpose of the thesis is to present a 
clear exposition of Hume's doctrine of causality, its place in 
Hume's philosophy, and consequently the exact foundations or 
premises on which Hume's conclusions concerning causality rest. 
The chief problem will be to discover how many distinct lines 
of argument are involved in Hume's apparent rejection of 
causality and how deeply Rume's premises are rooted in his copy 
theory of ideas, his atomism, his phenomenalism, and his view 
of human reason. 
As to procedure, the Treatise will be the main source 
followed in the positive exposition of Rume's doctrine. That 
7 Norman Kemp Smith, Ia& PhilosoPhY of David Hume. 
London, 1941. 
8 The pertinent writings of . these authors are listed 
in the bibliography. 
5 
Hume did not change his doctrine in any of its essentials after 
the Treatise is assumed in this thesis, as it is commonly assumed 
today. 
Kruse . 9 
The assumption rests on the findings of Fr. Vinding 
10 The Enquiry, which frequently oversha.dows the Treatise 
in clarity and conciseness of statement, will be employed largely 
as a reinforcement of the Treatise. 
In general, the exposition will follow the order of -
the Treatise. Chapter II will present Hume's critique of causali-
ty and causation. Chapter III presents a dominant feature of 
Hurne's theory, the doctrine on belief. This theory of belief 
is a necessary basis for the positive theory of causal inference 
propounded in Book I of the Treatise. The chapter is intended 
to put in focus Bumels usually overstressed rejection of causali-
ty by relating this reJection to his positive proposal. Chapter 
IV is a criticism of the positive doctrine posed in Chapter III. 
The chapter centers on three topics: various objections to 
Hume ' s analysis of cause, the aSSOCiation mechanism, and the 
cri t ical acceptance of custom. Chapter V attempts to determine 
the foundations, the assumptions and prem1s~s, which ground 
9 Fr. Vinding Kruse, Hume's PhilosophY in ~ frinci-
]al Work A Treatise ~ Human Nature ~ In His Essays. trans. 
P. T. Federspiel, London, 1939. 
10 David Hume, AIl EnquirY Concerning Human Un~erstand­
~ in Essals. Horal. PolItical, Aaa Literary. ed. by. H. 
Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1889, II, 3-135. Hereafter the 
Enquiry will be referred to by the letter I. 
6 
Bume's rtegative arguments in Chapter II. Finally, Chapter VI 
assumes the form of an epilogue containing a positive theory of 
causality to complement the criticism made of Hume in Chapter V. 
Throughout this treatment, two questions recur: What 
underlie s t he denial of the knowa bili ty of causa.li ty? And, even 
granting that Hurne developed a positive theory of belief, was 
the r eje ct ion of the knowability of real causality the necessary 
prel iminary to this theory of belief? 
CHAPTER II 
HOME'S CRITIQUE OF CAUSALITY AND CAUSATION 
Hurne's most extensive discussion of causality occurs 
Book I of the Treatise. The ostensive purpose of that work 
to inves tigate human nature, especially in relation to moral 
philosophy. Book I is a psychological and epistemological 
inquiry into human understanding. It stands as a necessary 
framework preliminary to the treatment of the passions and of 
Books II and III of the Treatise. 
Bume begins his analysis of the understanding with 
sucoessive inquiries into the origin of ideas, kinds of ideas, 
association of ideas in the imagination, relations, and 
abs tract i deas. The whole ·of Part II of Book I is devoted to 
the ideas of space and time. Having thus outlined the elements 
of his philosophy, Hume proceeds to the crucial question of 
the causal relation. 
This analysis and explanation of causality is Hume's 
mos t famous effort in the field of theoretical philosophy. For 
Bume, t he relation of cause and effect was the source arid basis 
for all our statements of fact, all our knowledge of real things 
not immediately present to the senses. Hence, outside present 
7 
8 
experience, a few intUitive propositions, and the proofs in 
geometry, the whole scope of knowledge hinged on the causal 
relati on. Causality is extremely important in such a view and 
its validity needed careful testing. 
Humels entire investigation was intended to be a 
search for t he elusive impr~ssion from which the idea of causal 
connection arose. But neither the qualities nor the relations 
of objects contained the required impression. Hume then leaves 
the "direct survey" and turns to two questions: why' we assent 
to t he general causal max1m, and why we believe in particular 
causal laws. 
The response to these questions provides a division 
of the contents of this chapter. First, Hume asserts that the 
causal maxim is neither ' self-evident nor can it be proved. 
Secondly, the inference or transition involved in the mind's 
, 
proceeding from a given A to a related but absent Z is not 
based on r ational demonstration. The inference is based on 
cus tom or the constant association of impressions and ideas in 
the imagination. Thirdly, the idea of necessary connection 
between cause and effect results from an internal impression 
or propensity to pass from an object to the idea of its usual 
attendant . 
This inbriet is the movement of Bume l s argumentation 
and the scope of this chapter. To shorten the synopsis would 
9 
be to spo i l the effect of this sustained philosophical argument. 
The pre sent chapter will delineate Hume's sinuous argument in 
some de tail , while following in large part the tortuous order 
of the Treatise. The beginning and end of the argument present 
a fairly clear logical structure. The middle ground is almost 
unavoidably circumambient. , 
Hume begins his argument by indicating the peculiar 
place causality holds as a species of reasoning. l Reasoning 
can be divided broadly into two classes: reasoning ccncerning 
the r elations of ideas and reasoning concerning factual relation-
ships. Reasonings concerning the relations of ideas give 
intuitive certainty (and then are not properly reasoning 
processes) , or demonstrative certainty. 
Reasonings which concern the relations between objects 
do not, suggests Hume, provide knowledge or certainty strictly 
so-called . The causal relation is the unique basis for all 
reasoning about factual relationships. By means of the' causal 
rela tion alone can we attain existing objects not present to the 
2 
senses or memory. The reason is that the other two factual 
relationships, identity and contiguity in space and time, are 
1 The sections in the Treatise correspondi~ to this 
chapter are: Book I, Part iii, Sections 1 through 6 (69-94) 
and Section 14 (155-172). 
2 ~ I, iii, 2 (74); 1, IV, i (24). 
10 
either teducible to cases of direct perception or are dependent 
3 
on the relation of cause and effect. Observations concerning up 
identity and the relations of time and place are not reasonings 
but instances of direct perception. However, if the observation 
concludes to some cons~ancy or invariability in the relations 
of time and place, it is because we have introduced the factor 
of some secret cause as uniting or separating them. The same 
is true of i dentity. Permanence or continuing identity ascribed 
to an object results from our presumption of causes sustaining 
the object during the intermim between perceptions.4 
Causality is, therefore, the principle of all infer-
ences about matters of fact. It is only the relation of 
causality which informs us of existences and objects not present, 
rThich can carry the mind from a present impression to one absent. 
It is upon this relation then that Hume will concentrate all 
his critical skill. 
According to Hume, every -idea is an exact copy of 
an impression. 5 And Kume, following out the methodological 
3 More properly, perhaps, causality is the foundation 
of a relation of dependence. Causality itself can be referred 
to the category of action. Hume's terminology, nonetheless, 
will be re tained. 
4 The alleged priority of causality to substantial 
identi ty will be consicered in Chapter V. 
/5 T, I, i, 1. (4, 5); E, II (14-17). Chapter V 
includes a discussion of the copy theory. 
11 
princiPl~ suggested by his theory of impressions and ideas, 
proceeds to search f ·or the impression from which the idea of 
causation arise s. There is no one quality or impression common 
to all objects called causes. The idea of causation must be 
then from some relation between objects. 
The first and most obvious relation existing between 
. 6 
causes and effects is that of contiguity in time and place. 
At this point -in the Treatise both contiguity and the temporal 
priority of cause to effect are considered essential to causality. 
Yet contiguity and succession do not exhaust the idea 
of causation. Hume refuses to take a merely "uniformity viewn7 
of causation. "There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into 
consideration, and that relation is of much greater importance 
than any of the other two above mentloned. ft8 It is this initial 
refusal to reduce causality to uniformity which launches Hume 
0n ,the intricate path along which his arguments will lead him. 
For Hume fail s to discover any known qualities in the objects 
upon which the relation of cause and effect could depend; he 
fail s to discover any impression or impressions ot 
6 ~ I, 111, 2 (75). Hereafter all references to the 
Treatise are to Book I of the Treatise unless otherwise indicated. 
7 Smith, PhilosophY of D. Bume, 369. 
8 T, iii, 2(77). 
12 
necessary connection. He is unwilling to cast aside so lightly 
his "fundamental" assumption that every idea is a copy of a 
preceding impression. At the least, this firmly established 
principle must be given credence until the present case is 
examined. 
Neither the qualities of the objects nor the relations 
'observed between "causes" and "effects" contained the required 
impression. Thus failing in his attempt to discover in sense 
and by experience the source of the idea of necessary connection, 
Hume determined upon a reversal of method: to investigate the 
i dea first instead of the impression. This indirect method leads 
him to a division of his topic into two questions: first, why 
we ~udge that ,everything that begins to be must have a cause, 
and why we conclude that such particular causes have such parti-
cular effects. 9 Hume distinguishes between the principle of 
causality and the law of univocal causation. These two laws 
exhaust the intelligibllity of the necessary connection among 
events. 
Concerning the first question: n'Tls a general maxim 
in philosophy, that whatever begins 1Q exist, must have ~ cause 
Qf exlstence."lO This assumption, or maxim, is not a matter of 
9 Ibid., (78) 
10 Ibid., lii, 3 (78). 
13 
knowledge. It is neither intuitively nor demonstratively 
certain: 
All certainty arise s from the comparison of ideas, 
and from the discovery of such relations as are unal-
terable, so long as the i deas continue the s a~e. These 
relations are resemblance, proportiQns in quantity and 
number, degrees of any quality, and contrariety; none of 
which are imply'd in this propostion, \\1ha-~ver has a 
beginning has also ~ cause of existence. I£at proposi-
tion therefore is not intuitively certain. 
Thi s analysis is a direct corollary from Bume's view 
of knowledge as based on the four philosophical r el ·ations named 
above. Aside from instances of immediate de facto perception, 
Hume accords knowledge or certainty only to propositions 
r egarding universal ideal contents. Only propositions expressing 
the relations between ideas can remain unalterably fixed, for 
t he relations "depend entirely on the ideas. n12 But propositions 
concerning factual relationships are not so unalterably fixed. 
I t was always conceivable for Hurne that an object might come 
i nto or go out of existence without having been caused to do 
so. A contingent fact can always be otherwise. When a man 
sees smoke he is forced to admit he sees smoke. But there is no 
i mmediate external evidence forcing him to admit there is also 
a fire there which he does not see. 
Knowledge and ~ertitude have been eliminated from the 
11 ~., (79). 
12 ~., iii, 1 (69). 
14 
area of ~xistents. The assertion that the principle of causcli-
t y is self-evident or of intuitive certcinty involves the denial 
of Hume's four relations as the sole sources of certcin know-
ledge. 
The causal maxim is not self-evident. Further it 
cannot be proved. The assumptions underlying the exclusion 
of certitude from the world of existence is more clearly 
evidenced in H~~e's proof that the principle of causality does 
not admit of demonstration. For the causal principle to be 
demonstrably certain, the following propostion must be proved: 
it is impossible that anything can ever begin to exist without 
a cause. 
If this proposition were true, the ideas of cause and 
effect would be necessarily connected. If necessarily connected, 
the ideas would not be separable. But the fact is that the ideas 
of cause and effect are distinct. Consequently these ideas are 
separable. One can think of a thing as non-existent at one 
moment and existent the next moment without introducing the idea 
of a cause. The contradictory of the law of causality is that 
something can begin to be without a cause. This proposition, 
according to the above analysis, is not self-contradictory. 
causal maxim cannot be demonstrated since its opposite is 
13 possible. 
13 "Now that the latter proposition is utterly 
II 
15 
~ Syllogistically, Hume's argument might be put in 
this fashion: 
All certitude arises from the relation of ideas. 
But cause and effect is not a relation between 
ideas but between existents. 
Hence, there is not certitude arising from the 
relation of cause and effect. 
This syllogism, which assumes that matters of fact are indemon-
strable, rests on the following: 
The demonstrable implies the contradiction of the opposite. 
But what we conceive as existent, we can conceive as 
non-existent • 
• : There is no being whose non-existence implies a 
contradiction • 
• : There is no being whose existence is demonstrable. 
If the principle of causality is certain, it must be 
self-evident or demonstrable. If it is self-evident, it must 
be at least negatively, though not properly, demonstrable by 
reduction to the principle of contradiction, i.e.,- by pointing 
incapable of a demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves 
by considering, that as all distinct ideas are separable from 
each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently 
distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be 
non-existent this momeht, and existent the next, without 
conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive 
principle. The separation, therefore, of tne idea of a cause 
from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible tor 
the i~gination; and consequently the actual separation of these 
objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction 
nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by 
any reasoning from mere ideas; without which 'tis impossible 
to demonstrate the necessity of a cause." T, lii, 3 (79-80). 
The underlying argument is presented even more suc-
cinctly in the ~gu1rY: "The contrary of every matter of fact 
is still possib~; because it can never imply a contradiction, 
and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and dis-
tinctness as if ever so ccnformable to realit ." IV i · 
16 
out the tmpossibility of the opposite. Hume grasps this 
clearly and rests his case on two points: the insufficiency 
of demonstrative reasoning in the matter, and his principle .of 
atomism, that what is distinguishable is separable. On first 
glance both of these principles appear independent of the copy 
theory of ideas. Whether they are actually so independent is 
matter tor a later chapter. 
Hurne adduces and disposes of three arguments for 
causality brought forward by his predecessors.14 The arguments 
of Hobbes15 and Clarke16 are refute'd as a preliminary step 
toward exposing the petitio in the. argument of Locke. Hobbes 
argues that a cause is required to determine an obje'ct to 
exist at some one time and at one place, rather than at any 
other. Clarke a.serts that it there were no causes, an object 
would have to produce itself. !he obvious objection to either 
argument is that it assumes what is to be proved, namely, the 
14 ~ iii, ) (80-81). 
15 Thomas Hobbes, %a!. Engl~Sh Works g: ThomaS Hobbes, 
ed. Sir William Molesworth, London, 1 39, I, 115; III, 94; 
IV, 276. . 
16 Samuel Cl~ke was a very influential thinker in 
England in the early eighteenth .century. He was interested in 
applications of physics in theological matters and regarded 
lewton's cosmology as the grand vindication of natural 
theology. Clarke, A Degqpstrat1gD 2l ~ Beipg !nS Attr1butes 
~~, 5th ed., London, 1719, 125. This reference tor the 
argument .Humecites 1s given by Jobn' Laird, Humels PhilQsophy 
~ Human Nature, Jew York, 19)1, 97. 
17 
nece ssitv of a cause at all. 17 Locke argues: "Whatever- is 
produced without any cause is produced by nothing: or in other 
words, has nothing as a cause. But nothing can never be a cause, 
no more than it can be something. n18 This falls -under the same 
objection. When we exclude all causes we really exclude them, 
and do not suppose the object or anything else to be the cause 
of its existence. Humels objections here are well grounded. 
Each of his adversaries attempts to prove something indemonstra-
ble. Locke's argumen~if it were more felicitously worded to 
avoid dispute hinging on the word produced, might have escaped 
the objection.19 
Hume's indirect method led to two questions. The 
first asked why we judge that everything that begins to be must 
have a cause. Hume concluded that this causal ma~ was not -
self-evident, nor could it be proved. Yet we hold this maxim 
17 In arguing with Locke, perhaps Dume had a passage 
, like the following in mind: wIn the next place, man knows, bY 
an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce 
any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a 
man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of all being, 
cannot be equal to two rightangles, it is impossible he should 
know any demonstration in Euclid •• ' . Vbat was not from eternity 
had a beginning; and what had a beginning must be produced by 
something else." John Locke, An Essay Concernipg ~ under-
standing, IV, x, 3, ed. Alexander C. Fraser, oxtor~94, 
II, 307-308. 
18 -~ 1ii, 3 (81). 
19 Hume has shown that same alleged proofs are 
invalid. Other explanations are still possible. 
18 
wi th con'fiction and make particular inferences with assurance,. 
Our assurance or opinion, Hume tells us, must rest on "observa-
tion and experience. H20 The two sources of knowledge previously 
discussed are intuition and deductive reasoning. By observation 
and experience, Hume must mean some sort of induction. 
The second questi~n then is how this causal principle 
arises from experience. This general question is particularized 
into the form: "Why ~ conclude, that !Y&h particular causes 
must necessarily have ~ particular ettects , ~ J!bl. l!!. ~) 
!a inference fr.om one !Q another?,,21 
Every inference must begin with some impress1on, 
some actual given, s1nce it cannot begin from nothing or go on 
indefinitely. In reasonings concerning cause and eff~ct, the 
mind always goes from the impress10n present to th~ idea of the 
absent but correlative object. There are then three ,things to 
explain: "First. The original impress1on. Secondly, The 
transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect. 
The nature and quali ties of that idea. ,,22 
Concerning the flrst element to be explained, 
impressions ot sensation are perfectly inexplicable tor Buae; 
whether they come tram the ' object, the mind, or God is an 
20 L 1ii, :3 (82). 
21 lW. 
22 ~., lil, 5 (84). 
19 
apparen~ly insoluble Question. Impressions of memory are 
distinguished from fancies of the im&gination only by their 
f d ·· t 23 orce an VlvaCl y. 
The following rema.rks concentrate on the second 
member of the tripartite division, the transition or inference. 
Stated in its simplest terms HlliTIefS problem concerning the 
transition or inference is as follows: 
Let us now see upon what our inference is founded, 
when we conclude from the one (a causej that the other 
(its effect] has existed or will exist. Suppose I see 
a ball moving in a streight line towards another, I imme-
diately conclude, that they will shock, and that the 
second will be in motion. This is the inference from 
cause to effect; and of this nature are all our reasonings 
in the conduct of life: on this is founded all our 
belief in history: and from hence is derived all philo-
s.oPhy, excepting only geometry and arithmetic '. JIf we can 
explain the inference from the shock of two balls, we 
shall be able to ~c;count for this operation of the mind 
in all instances. 4 
The first observation is that the inference is not 
based on a penetration into the essences which might reveal 
23 Ibid., (84-86). 
24 David Hume, An Abstract of ~ Treatise of .Human 
Nature, 1740, reprinted with an Introduction by J. M. Keynes 
and P. Sraffa, Cambridge, 1938, 13. This pamphlet, called the 
Abstract, was hitherto unknown to Hume's biographers. Only 
recently was a copy discovered by Keynes and Sraffa, who argue 
convincingly that the little work is authentically Humefs 
and not Adam Smith's as was formerly supposed. 
The passage cited is an evidence of the assumption 
that the rationality belonging to the principle of causality 
should be transferable to the individual instances of causation. 
20 
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the necessary dependence of one thing on another. Thus there 
is no implication holding between impression and idea: 
There is no object, which implies the existence of any 
other if we consider these objects in themselves, and 
never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such 
an inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply 
the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving 
any thing different. But as all distinct ideas are . 
separable'25'tis evident there can be no impossibility of 
that kind. . 
Here is again expressed the principle that what is distinguish-
able is separable. Hobart considers it the major conclusion of 
Hume. He writes that Hume's "whole discovery" about cause and 
effect comes to thiS, that "a proposition may imply another 
proposition, but a thing cannot imply another thing."26 
Thus the idea associated with the impression might be 
displaced and another substituted for it. There 1s no contra-
diction for Hume in the denying of any fact that it implie·s the 
existence of any other fact. 
This assertion, that reason is incapable of attaining 
necessary connection between cause and effect, is elaborated 
with special insistence in the Enquiry. In fact, the clarity 
and varied repetition of this prbposition is the greate~t 
contribution of the Enquiry to the present chapter. 
25 ~ iii, 6 (86~87). 
26 R. E. Hobart, nSume W1 thout Sceptic1sm,. "H~nd, 
ondon, XXXIX, July, 1930, 273. 
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-According to Hume in the Enguirr, the relation of 
cause and effect is in no wise discoverable A Rr1or1. We could 
never know that fire burned or that men talked or that gunpowder 
exploded except from experience: 
When we reason ~ prior1. and consider merely any object or 
cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all 
observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any 
distinct object, such as its effect; much less, she~7us the 
inseparable and inviolable connection between them. 
The man brought suddenly into the world could only 
discover succession because "the particular powers, by which all 
natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses. n28 
Before the event anything is conceivable. Before the collision 
of two billiard balls one might imagine both billiard balls to 
stand still, or the ' second ball to remain in its pOSition, or 
either to bounce off in a hundred possible directions. nAll the 
suppositions are consistent and conceivable. n29 But certitude 
requires the exclusion 'or even the possibility of the opposite. 
Here the oppOSite is conceivable -and hence poss1Dle. 30 
27 10 IV, i (28); also, 24-25, 26, 27. 
28 L V, i (36). 
29 IU IV, i (26). 
30 Th1s 1s not strictly reducible to the classic case: 
nSocrates, while he is s1tting, sits w1th metapbYsical certitude. 
In Hume's instance the disputed object is not an object ot 
direct perception, but is inferred, ,argued to, and hence absent 
from direct perception. 
22 
€ince the causal inference is not discovered A priori 
by reason, it must be experiential in nature. Concretely 
experience means this: 
We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence 
of one species of objects; and also remember, that the 
individuals of another species of objects have always 
attended them, and have existed in a regular 03~er of 
contiguity and succession with regard to them. 
Experience means impressions taken collectively. It is the 
memory, continued to the present instance, of one class of 
objects in constant ordered succession with another. After 
innumerable instances of the conjunction of the object flame 
and the sensation heat. "without further ceremony" (without 
bothering about real essences and powers) we call the one cause 
and the other effect • 
Experience' gives us the repetition of events. Instead 
of a single & followed by Z, we have a number of instances of 
~ followed by z. Hume calls this contribution of experience 
"constant conjunction." This new feature offers promise but 
it does not absolve us of all difficulties. For if one instance 
is insufficient to explain the necessary connection between 
cause and effect, the mere repetition of similar instances will 
not advance us along the way. Causality is not reducible, as 
noted earlier, merely to constant conjunction, and Hume was 
quite averse to saying that we bad an impression of repetition. 
31 lJ lli, 6 (87). 
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£e here forecasts his conclusion that in the end it 
may turn out that the necessary connection depends on the 
inference, instead of the inference depending on the necessary 
connection. 32 
Reason does not penetrate the essences of things so 
as to grasp a necessary nexus, between two things. Reason cannot 
discover ~ priori a necessary relation of cause and effect 
between two objects. But with the addition of experience, with 
the help of repeated instances of the conjunction of pairs of 
objects, can reason thus aided by experience make the transition 
or causal inference? For de facto, and Hume is always conscious 
of this point, we do make the inference: 
If reason determin'd us, it wou'd proceed. upon that principl 
that instances, of which we have had no experience, must 
resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that~-:t 
the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.~j 
This proposition cannot be demonstrated, sinoe a change 
in the course of nature is conceivable and thus possible. The 
argument taking shape here can be stated formally: 
Reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on the 
relation of cause and effect. 
But reasoning concerning that relation is based on exper-
i'ence. 
But conclusions from experience are NOT based on reason • 
• : Reasoning concerning matters oi fact (eXistents, causes, 
effects) are NO! based on reason. (Hence the infer-
ences are not strictly reasonings or rational at all.) 
32 ~., (88). 
33 Ibid., (89); also ~ IV, i1 (3O-33). 
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~nen we argue from a present cause to an absent effect 
which customarily accompanies that c~use, our inference is b&sed 
on experience. But Hume is careful to point out that experience 
of its very nature can inform us only of the past and present, not 
of the future. Experience is ·the memory of classes of objects 
constantly conjoined in the past together with a present instance 
of their conjunction, or of one member of the assccib.tion. 
Experience cannot justify the inference since experience cannot 
3~ 
bridge the chasm separating the }.last and present from the future. 
Rather, an assumption 1s added to the data of exper-
ience. Ve presume that the future will be conformable to the 
past. The inference is as valid and rational as this presumption 
on which the inference is based. Reason, again showing its 
impotence in the existential and factual order, cannot indicate 
why the presumption must be so, whY the- course of nature aust 
continue in the future along the patterns it has exhibited in the 
past. Without reference to his COPT theory or his atomism, Kume 
points out that the uniformity of nature is not demonstrable. 35 
34 ~ 111, 6 (89). 
35 on this point MacNabb remarks: "Bume does not deny 
that the uniformity of nature is the 'presumption' on which all 
probable reasoning is founded. His point is that it ls merelT a 
presumption, which cannot be proved." D. G. C. MacNabb, ~
~: lU!. Theon 2!: Knowledge and Morality, London, 1951~ 
. , 
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The argument from experience does not give certainty. 
Yet it might yield probability; it might tell us what is likely 
to happen in the future. Probability is usually the balancing 
.... 
-
of a set of conflicting experiences, such as the casting of a die. 
Given the six faces of the die and a definite number of throws, 
we can proceed to calculate the frequency with which each face 
turns up and consequently the probability in anyone instance. 
With uniform experience there is no ground for calc~ation of 
possibility. The mathematical calculus of probabilities has no 
material to work on other than uncontradicted and invariable 
sequence. The probal?ility that the sun will rise tomorrow 
cannot be calculated from a series of opposed experiences. The 
I probability must rest on the presumption that the future will 
r be conformable to the· past. The presumption cannot Itself "arise 
from probabllity.w36 
NO "logical reason" can be offered for the presumption. 
Therefore inferences from particular causes to particular effects 
our assurance and conT1ct1'Oll of the necessity of these particular 
causal relations, can be justified neither as demonstrable nor 
probable. 
lor the sake of argument Kume now grants his opponents 
that a certain cause had actually produced a certain effect in 
36 L lil, 6 (90). 
" 
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the past. He returns to his original observation in this present 
analysis of univocal causality, namely, that there is no pene-
tration of essences whereby we might discover the necessary 
connection of one object with another. Thougb there might have 
been one instance in which an object with these sensible quali-
ties had the power and actually produced this effect, yet there 
is no known necessary connection between these sensible external 
qualities and the secret powers of the nature: 
there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities 
and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is 
not led to for.m such a conclusion concerning their const~~ 
conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature. 
Experience can account only for the precise period ot 
time that falls under its cognizance. All the effects of a 
secret nature might change without any change in the sensible 
qualities. 'The color, texture, and other sensible qualities of 
bread have no connection with the secret powers of nourishment 
38 
and support. 
This last argument bears out the logical connection 
between the denial of the principle of causality and the denial 
of an individual instance. Consequently, the argument indicates 
the interdependence of the tvo major questions which constituted 
I, 
• 
37 I," IV, ii (29-30). 
38 ~., (34). 
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Hurne's ind'irect method. The denial of the causal maxim entails 
the deni al of necessity in particular causal laws. For to know 
tha t a .-. articular thing i s a s ::ecific cause Hith a specific 
effect, one must know that it is of a specific nature. To know 
this inner nature one must proceed from sensible phenomena to 
underlying sUbstance. This m~ans to go from effect to cause. 
But this is the very ~rinciple in question. 
This much is clear. However repeated sequence might 
enter in as a psychological conditioner or prerequisite in the 
formation, clarification, and testing of the notion of causality, 
repeated sequence or constant conjunction of particular cases 
of "causality" cannot establish the principle of causality in 
the sense of every contingent being demanding a cause. The 
assent to a specific instance of univocal causality presupposes 
the penetration of a nature. The penetration of a nature 
implicitly involves the rational demand of a sufficient reason 
for the sensible phenomena. 
Hume's second question was why we conclude that parti-
cular causes have particular effects. The response to this 
question involved a discussion of causal inference or transition, 
the second element of causal reasoning. The discuss10n comprised 
three points especially. First, the inference is not based on 
any rational penetration of essences which might reveal the 
ecessary dependence of one thing on another. Nor is the relation 
28 
of cause and "effect in any 'Ha y d i scoverCible §.. priori. Sec onc.ly, 
reason even aided by experience cannot mCi}~e the tr2 .. nsi tion, since 
mere repetition of instances does not reveal a neces5ary connec-
tion. Nor can the inference be justified a s probable since the 
probability would rest on a presumption. Thirdly, granting one 
instance in which a certain cause actually produced a certain 
effect, yet there is no known necessary connection between a set 
of sensible qualities and the secret powers of the given cause. 
To conclude, there 1s in all reasoning from experience 
a step which is 'not supported by any argument. nIf the mind be 
not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced 
by some other principle of equal weight and authority; and that 
principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature ' 
remains the same.,,39 There is no such thing as causal inference. 
The imagination, not the understanding, habit and not reason, 
custom and not evidence, is at work. The nature of the transi-
tion is the work of associations of perceptions in the imagina-
tion. 
The third element of causal reasoning, the nature and 
qualities of the idea of the connected cause or effect, remains. 
owever, instead of finding our way through the intricate laby-
rinth of argument explaining belief, it is more consonant with 
39 ~, V, i (36). 
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the purposes of this study to proceed to Section 14 of the 
Treatise, where Hume returns upon his footsteps to reconsider 
the idea of necessary connection. 
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION, 
The inference which 'rests on the idea of necessity 
has been explained. The ~pression, the origin of that idea, 
is now the matter of investigation. The inference turned out 
to be not "inference" but a transition determined by a natural 
necessity. From the logical justification of inference the 
question moved to the psychological grounding for belief. 
The present section will be somewh~t repetitive of the 
preceding inves~igation. The precise objective is to determine 
what we mean by power, cause, efficacy, efficiency, in shqrt: 
"~ II 2.Y.t ~ of n§cessitl. l!b!m we J.U. that two objects 
~ necessarily connected. ft40 
Briefly, in the opening page of Section 14, Hums sums 
up his whole position on the matter. Since ideas are copies of 
impressions, we must find the impression corresponding to the 
idea of necessity. But the objects considered necessarily 
'related, causes and effects, present themselves only as con-
tiguous,' succeSSive, and constantly conjoined. Nonetheless, 
frequent repetition somehow produces a new iapress10n by which 
30 
~ 
the mind is determined to go from a present object to its usual 
attendant. This impression of determination is the source of 
the idea of necessity.41 
Since this is an all-important stage in the main 
argument, the ground will be carefully traced out which Hume 
himself retraverses in arriving at this ne~i impression. The 
logical sequence of the argument can be briefly presented under 
eight headings: 
1. One experience of an object gives no ground for conjecture 
as to its effect. If we perceived the power of the cause, we 
could foresee the effect.42 
2. Whence the notion of power then? Reason alone cannot produce 
an original idea (an idea not copied trom an impression). 
Reason cannot conclude that a cause is necessary to every 
beginning of existence. Con$equently Locke's argument from 
several productions in matter Is ot no avail. The substantial 
forms, and "accidents, and faculties," invoked by the "scholas-
tics" to explain the operatlons of bodies, are all equally unin-
telligible. Since extension excludes motion or efficacy, the 
Cartesians conclude that God Is the cause of motions and opera-
tions in matter. But we have no iapressionof Deity from which 
41 ~., (156). 
42 This and the followlns numbered paragraphs are 
based on Treatise, 111, 14 (157-169) unless otherwise noted. 
L-______ ~----------~--~_~~~~~------~~~----~-~, ----~~ L 
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we could derive the notion of power. 
J. The idea must be from experience. Yet there is no instance 
of a cause where we discover the power of the operating principle 
"wherein the power is perceiv'd to exert itself. n43 If we have 
an abstract or general idea of power, we ought to be able to 
conceive some particular powe~ in a particular body. But to 
conceive or comprehend the necessary bond between a cause . and 
its effect would imply the absolute impossibility for one object 
not to follm; upon the other. 
4. Thus we have no true idea of necessity in objects. Even 
after we experience both cause and effect, the nature of the 
connection between them remains wholly mysterious. Yet the 
idea of necessity must. have some meaning. 
5. A multiplicity of resembling instances must give us the idea 
since one instance is insufficient. Yet constancy of conjunction 
does not give grounds for rationally inferring that the conjunc-
tion is a causal one. Repetition alone does not discover any-
thing new in the objects. Repetition of impressions and ideas 
adds nothing to them, produoes noth1ng in the objects, since 
being repeated is not a qualifying pred1cate. The several 
instances are entirely independent. Power l necessity, efficiency 
represent nothing in things. 
43 Ibid., (160). 
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·6. The resembling instances do produce a new impression in the 
mind: 
Necessity, then is the effect of this observation, and is 
nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a d~ter­
.mination to carry our thoughts from one object to ano~er. 
Without considering it in this view, we can never arrive 
at the most distant notion of it, or be able to attrl~te 
it either to external,Qr internal objects, to spirlt or body 
to causes or effects.44' 
Necessary connection is the same as the transition arislng frOM 
the accustomed union. 
7. The impression, not from sensation, must be internal. 
the propensity, produced by custom, to pass fraa an object to the 
idea of its usual attendant. Efficacy, necessity, 1s someth1n& 
in the mind. . 
8. Yet, this necessity is conjoined with things, slnce "the 
mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external 
and to conjoin with them any internal im~ressions, which they 
occaSion, and which always make their appearance at the same 
time that these objects discover themselves to the senses. n45 
Just as we link secondary qualities ot sound, color, 
to objects, so we suppose necesslty and power to lie 
we conSider, not in the mind that considers them. This pro-
penSity is not the same as anthropomorphic projection. 
44 Ibid., (165). 
45 Ibid., (167). 
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~ere are several corollarles to this line of argument. 
Necessary connectlon ls a datum of introspection, not of sensa-
tion. Hume ls not abollshing necessary connection, but analyzing 
it. We find through retlective observatlon a causal connectlon 
exhibited in the mind, a connection between perceptions. This 
connection is assented to in belief, but is as unintelligible 
to us, as mfsterious, as the connection between external objects. 
The causal connection ot impression and idea is the new deter-
mination in the mind to pass from one to the other. 
There are two distinct factors in the idea 
connection, "one as cgnditiop±pg it, and one as constituting it. 
Constancy of conjunction is requisite as that through which alone 
a custom or habit can be acQuired. w46 The feeling47 generated 
by this custom is that which const1tutes our impression. 
Accord1ngly, there are two definit10ns of causa11ty 
pOSSible, as a ph11osophical and a natural relation. Cause is 
"'An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all 
the objects resembling the former are placid in like relations 
of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the 
latter.,n48 This is cause'and effect defined as a philosophical 
46 
feeling will be treated 
in the 
48 !J iii, s defined more succinctly 
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relation, and implying contiguity, succession, and constant con-
junction. As a natural relation: "A CAUSE is an object prece-
dent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the 
idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other 
and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the 
other. n49 This is an ostensive rather than a logical definition. 
Bume reduces cause and effect to succession or uniformity only 
as a philosophical relation. As a natural relation it is a 
determination of the mind, an associative connection and a 
process of enlivening. The word "determination" must not be 
taken to mean real connection, in which event Hume would be 
entangled in his own dilemma of defining by synonyms. Hume is 
giving a causal account of the origin of our idea, which account 
itself is reducible to succession and constant conJunction. The 
one distinct element is the felt determination. Feeling does not 
give us knowledge of necessity. 
Our causal sentence does three things: it states that 
A has been constantly conjoined with B; it states that when A 
occurs again, B will occur again; it expresses the "comfortable 
'r 
" 
in the Enquiry as "an object, followed b.Y another, and where all 1 
the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects simi-
lar to the second." IU VII, 11 (63). 
49 lJ 111, 14 (170). Necessity may be defined in two 
correlative ways: "It consists either in the constant conJunc-
tion of like objects, or 1n the 1nference of the understanding 
from one object to another." ~ VIII, 11 (79). 
Or. ~ 
r 
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feeling of of-course-ness which we have when we pass, as we 
habitually do, from the one of these beliefs to the other. n50 
As the argument unfolded, the underlying and explicit 
premises or assumptions of Hume have been noted. At this point 
it will be profitable to gather up the loose ends and state 
explicitly these premises. 
Regarding the principle of causality, the first 
argument is based on Hume's conception of the scope of intuitive 
certainty. There can be only opinion with regard to matter of 
fact or existence. The second argument depends on . the principle 
of his atomism, namely, that ideas are separate and that no fact 
implies the existence of any other. A third premise supporting 
both arguments is the insufficiency of demonstrative reasoning 
in the matter. 
The rej~ction of the law of causation is based on the 
following: The mind attains only perceptions. There is no 
penetration of real essences. The ideas of cause and effect 
are separable; there is no implication holding between an impres-
sion and an idea. The rationality of the principle should be 
transferable to the individual instances. 
The analysis of necessary connection reveals these 
assumptions: Ideas are copies of impressions; reason alon~ 
50 H. H. Price, nThe Permanent Significance of Hume's 
Philosophy," Philosophy, London, xy, January, 1940* 22. 
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can give no new idea. If we perceived the power, we could 
foresee the effect. Reason cannot demonstrate a necessary 
connection, since it is always conceivable for one object not 
to follow another. 
The dialectic pursued throughout this lengthy chapter 
leads to this: the causal maxim is not known by intuition, nor 
b.Y ~ priori demonstrative reasoning, nor by experiential induc-
~ . 
tlve reasoning, nor is it found in the content of sense exper-
ience. 
But does Bume deny the truth of the causal maxim? In 
a letter addressed to John Stewart, Hume clearly maintains: 
I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as That any thing 
might arise without a Cause: I only maintain'd, that our 
Certainty and Falshood of that Proposition proceeded 
neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another 
Source. That Caesar existed, that there is such an Island 
as Sicily; for these Propositions, I affirm, ' we have no 
demonstrative nor intuitive Proof. Would you infer that I 
deny their Truth or even their Certainty.51 
From this it is frequently said that Bume did not deny causality, 
' 52 but the rationality of the causal principle. Bume assents to 
the independent existence of bodies and to the independent 
existence of causes. The affirmative answer rests in each case 
51 David Bume, The Letters ~ David Hume. ed. J. Y. T. 
Greig, Oxford, 1932, I, 185. This letter was written in February 
1754, fifteen years after the first publication of the Treatise. 
52 T. E. Jessop, "Some Misunderstandings of Hume," 
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Bruxelles, VI, No. 20, 
Fasciculus 2, 1952, 100. 
on nnatura~ belief." 
Yet there are difficulities in the matter. Hume says 
he never denied cause. Cause may refer to a real agent which 
actually produces another thing so that there is a necessary 
connection of dependence between the cause and the effect. Cause 
may simply mean an impression regularly associated with another 
so that the recurrence of one gives rise to the idea of the 
other. If Hurne means "cause" in this second sense, then he 
cannot help but affirm the existence of causes. Unknown causes 
are self-contradictory notions if "cause" means impressions 
regularly associated, since impressions are necessarily known. 
The question is this: is Hume merely an agnostic or a 
sceptic? If an agnostic, Hume does not deny the independent 
reality of substances, causes, and selTes, but asserts we do not 
know whether the intellect attains them. If Hume is a sceptic,53 
then unknown causes and permanent selves are self-contradictory 
notions. 
Restricting ourselves merely to causal connection, 
if we take Hume to be an agnostic and not a sceptic, we must 
take him to be maintaining the following propositions: We know 
what we mean by cause and necessity. We do not mean ideas 
53 By sceptic is meant explicitly one who doubts the 
validity of the intellect. It is admitted throughout this dis-
cussion that Hurne has another avenue to reality other than 
intellect or reason. 
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regularly ~ssociated with impressions or propensities of the mind 
to pass from one to another. We do mean real connection between 
external objects. But we find no warrant for asserting the 
actual existence of instances of this real connection. 
This sequence of statements renders Hume consistent. 
However, since Hume tends tow~rd the modern theory that the 
meaning of a proposition is its verification, he would probably 
deny the second proposition above: "We do not mean ideas ••• n 
The probability of this denial can be corroborated by two 
instances. 
First,' Hume states that we have no clear idea of power 
in any object: nwhen we say we desire to know the ultimate 
and operating principle, as something, which resides in the 
external object, we either contradiot ourselves, or 
a meaning. n54 This reveals an apparent insensitivity to consis-
tency when paralleled with Section 6 of Part iii. There Hume 
seems to allow that things have real essences, though we do not 
penetrate beyond the sensible appearances. Here he insists that 
the supposition is nonsensical. 
Bume's doctrine on the external world furnishes the 
second instance. Hume first states that the external world 
certainly exists and it is impossible to doubt its existence, and 
54 ~ iv, 7 (267). 
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next through a philosophical investigation shows that this 
selfsame assumption, which it is impossible to doubt, has no 
basis 1-lhatever. Experiments show that perceptions do not have 
a distinct existence; but if this is the case, it is also a 
contradiction to speak of their continued existence. 55 
The problem resolves itself into this. If substances, 
causes, and selves are unintelligible, how can we believe in 
them? It is difficult to see how a man can assent to a proposi-
tion which has no meaning, which is unintelligible. He is 
equivalently believing in nothing. A man can believe in that 
which is beyond the power of the intellect to know, but can a 
man believe in that which his intellect tells him is impossible? 
On the other hand, the following position is consistent 
and understandable. Objective necessary connection is intelli-
gible and possible. The intellect does not grasp this objective 
necessary connection. Nonetheless man feels compelled to 
in objective necessary connection. However the instances cited 
above indicate that 'Hume was not always willing to admit that 
objective necessary connection or permanent substances are 
intelligible and possible. 
There is no easy way out of this dilemma. The 
plainest solution, apparently, is the self-styled distinction 
55 I, iv, 2 (208). 
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of Hume as ! man and as a philosopher. As a man, Hume believes 
in the external world and in objective causal connection. The 
belief is the uork of the imagination and is the foundation 
for ali reasonings about factual relationships. It is not 
likely that we are to take for granted what is without meaning. 
There is meaning, s6 to speak, on the level of the imagination. 
But these beliefs are not the basis for demonstrative 
reasoning. By philosophical reflection Hume can and does 
question these beliefs. Philosophical reflection will not root 
out for good belief in the external world or objective necessity, 
but it can enjoy a temporary speculative doubt. 
Belief takes charge at the point where knowledge ends. 
Belief is not an extension of knowledge, but a substitute for it. 
Having denied the rationality of the causal maxim, 
the problem for Hume is to show in virtue of what the causal 
inference is felt to be ineluctable. The ,following chapter 
will delineate the all-important notion of belief, especially 
in relation to causality. It' will afford a positive complement 
to the critical side of Bume set forth in this chapter. 
56 I, iv, 7 (269)~ 
CHAPTER III 
HOME'S CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY: BELIEF III CAUSALITY 
Causal inference does not consist in the rational 
inspection of the relations of ob3ects, but is a psychologioally 
determined process. It has no logical basis, but only constant 
conditions. This is Humets basic argument. There remains 
little to do but to psychologize. 
Of the thre~ ~lementsl constituting our causal argu-
ments which Hume proposed to explain, only one remains. It is 
the nature and qualities of the idea of the connected cause or 
effect. The precise nature of the idea ushers us into a dominant 
feature of Hume's theory, the doctrine on belief. 
In his approach to belief, Bume is selr-consciously 
original. "Here is a new question unthought of by philosophers.n2 
This theory is a necessary baSis for the positive theory of 
causal inference propounded in Book I. ' The importance Hume 
attached to the doctrine can be seen 1n the fact that tne major 
portion of the Appendix to Book III is devoted to correcting 
possible misapprehensions ot this doctrine. The material of the 
1 1J iii, 5 (84). 
2 Abstract, 17 
~ 
Appendix *s succinctly repeated--sometimes almost to the word--
in the Enquiry. And as noted, the Abstract is insistent on the 
notion of belief. 
Hume is concerned solely with belief in facts. Despite 
the absence of rational justification, we human beings are under 
psychological compulsion to believe in the existence of objects. 
Further, we draw absent objects onto the level of the system ot 
present perceptions. 
Hume's task 1s to describe and explain this belief. 
His approach is to distinguish between conceptual content and 
belief-quality. This distinction is a familiar dichotomy and 
has its parallels and precedents throughout the history of 
philosophy. The earlier Scholastics d1stinguished between 
concept and judgment and between essence and existence. And 
after Hume, Kant was to emphasize the world of difference between 
a hundred existing thalers and the mere idea of the same. But 
the importance of the distinction was somewhat minimized by 
decadent Scholastics and Rationalists. The Cartesian notion of 
the idea was so all pervasive as to obscure the value ot the 
judgment. Consequently, the renewed emphasis of this distinction · 
is a real contribution of Hume, rivaling in value his insistence 
on the experiential nature of the causal inference. 
Every causal inference terminates in canclusio~ 
concerning the existence of objects. But existence makes no 
, 
" 
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addition to the ideal content of an obJect. 3 The difference 
between the conception and belief in an object must lie in 
the mfPAer of conceiving it. 
The difference between believing or not believing 
an intuitively or demonstrably certain proposition consists in 
this, that the imagination cannot conceive anything contrary to 
the demonstration. The person is determined to conceive the 
proposition in one manner. But in the absence of absolute 
necessity in causal reasonings, "the imagination is free to 
conceive both sides )of the .question.~4 Since both are possible, 
why belief rather than incredulity? 
We can conceive the proposition, whether we believe 
or disbelieve it. The difference again must lie in the manner 
of conceiving. A belief is then defined, "A LIVELY IDEA 
RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION.n5 The 
opening pages of the Treatise prepared the way for this definition 
by the famous distinction between impressions and ideas. These 
differ from one another only in point of their different degrees 
of force and vivacity. , To believe in an object as existent is to 
accord it the same value as sense impressions. An idea achieving 
3 L ii, 6 (66-67). 
4 I, iii, 7 (95). 
5 Ibid., (96). 
.. 
the status of belief must, then, have acquired a like force and 
vivacity. 
The characteristic of a conc,eption which has attained 
the belief status is the liveliness of the idea, or better, a 
lively idea. A process of enlivening is the prelude to belief. 
And the enlivening can come about only through relation with 
sense impressions which are by definition forceful and lively. 
The vivacity bestowed on the idea is explained by this 
principle: "that when any impression becomes present to us, it 
not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, 
but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and 
vivacity. "6 
This communication or transfusion of feeling is happily 
clarified in the comparison suggested by N. Kemp Smith.7 His 
main assertion is that Hume entered philosophy by ' the gateway or 
morals, and specifically that Books II and III of the Treatise. 
the parts on morals, were written prior to the more famous Book Ii 
further, that Hume came to the writing of Book I with his doctrine 
on belief already in mind and with the conOern to la1 the 
theoretical groundwork for his moral philosophy which follows. 
It has been indicated that the doctrine of belief is foreshadowed 
6 ill!1., (97). 
7 "Inaugural Address," HJ.wI. JUlJ1 prfts'¥t DIY pr~blems, 
a symposium, Proceedings 9t.. lll.I. ArIiWtiIIanoc ,tip LOn on, 
Supplementary Volume XVIII, 1939, xxi-xxv. ' 
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in the openlng sentences of Part i, even though belief is allowed 
to appear under its own name only in Part iii. Smith suggests 
that in formulating a theory of the passions and of sympathy 
Hume was led in due course to attempt to work out an analogous 
view of belief. 
Sympathy is not a distinct type of sentiment. Sympathy 
is a state of feeling together with others. It is a state in 
which observing the signs of some emotion in others, we are led 
through association to form the idea of that emotion. The ever 
present impression of the self enlivens the ~ of the emotion, 
transfusing a force and liveliness proper to the self, and 
thereby in effect transforming it into an actual emotion. The 
suppositions are two: (1) the impression of the self tends to 
transfuse its liveliness; and (2) Simple ideas are copies of 
impressions so that by an increase in torce and liveliness they 
operate on the mind in the same way as an impression. 
Belief in causal inference is a ?arallel phenomenon. 
What would otherwise be an idea acquires an influence on the mind 
proper to an impression. The impreSSion is some impression of 
sense paralleling the impression of the self which operates in 
sympathy. 
Since every idea is related to an impression, since 
belief super-adds nothing to the content of the idea, there are 
three elements involved: "a present impreSSion, a lively idea, 
46 
., 
and a relation or association in the fancy betwixt the impression 
and the idea.,,8 Since the phenomenon of belief is internal, 
whatever connection we may imagine between the present object 
and the inferred object, these qualities are unknown and cannot 
produce the belief. The present impression, ' provided it was 
observed in past instances, is the true cause of the idea and 
·belief. The belief arises without any new operation of the 
reason. Instead of a process of ratiocination, the belief pro-
ceeds from custom. Custom here means whatever proceeds from a 
past repetition without any intervening reasoning. For this 
process, a present impression is absolutely necessary.9 
The conclusion follows neatly tpat "all probable 
reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. fl10 In this 
paragraph Hume is a little forceful, perhaps overplaying his 
hand with the strength of logic. For all reasoning is said 
to be based on "taste," "sentiment," superior "feeling," 
"custom." CUstom appears to be truly King, in Hume's 0'Wll 
forceful phrase. Whether it be an usurped sovereignty remains 
for later discussion. 
~ The doctrine here developed', which followed closely 
8 T, iii, 8 (101); I, V, i (40). 
9 I" iii, 8 (102-103). The meaning of custom is 
treated more in detail on pages 50-53 of this chapter. 
10 T, iii, 8 (103). 
47 
Sections 7 e to 10 of Book I, Part iii of the Treatise, may be 
summarized under the following points: 
1. Belief names the manner in which the mind apprehends an ob-
ject as existent. Belief in existence adds nothing to the 
content. 
2. The only significant difference between an impression and an 
idea is a difference in force and vivacity. An idea, then, must 
be "enlivenedh to operate on the mind after the manner of an 
imT) ression. ll ~ 
3. Belief in facts is a phenomenon parallel to sympathy. All 
impressions can transfuse their own vivacity into an associated 
idea. 
4. Belief involves just three conditions: a present impression, 
a lively idea, and an association between them. The constancy 
of the association is proportionate to the belief. 
Several fundamental questions are left unsettled by 
this exposition. Is belief merely vivacity of an idea or , a 
distinct act of the mind? Is the difference between impressions 
and ideas one of kind or merely one of degree? What is the 
nature of custom? 
As to the first question, in the Treatise Rume commonly 
held that belief in existence was a manner of conceiving. The 
, , 
11 I, lii, 10 (119). 
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belief-manne~ was usually described as force, liveliness, or 
vivacity. Hume said rather explicitly: "we must not be con-
tented with saying, that the vividness of the idea produced the 
belief: We must maintain that they (vividness of idea and belief) 
are individually the same. n12 
To identify belief with a degree of vivacity involves 
difficulties. Hurne was singularly dissatisfied with his treatment 
of belief and chafed under its inadequacies. Several passages 
from the, Appendix to Book III will indicate Hume's own corrected 
view: 
Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment. 
There is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions 
which are the objects of conviction and assurance than in 
the loose and indolent reveries of the castle-builder. 
When I would explain this mApper, I sca~efind any word 
that fully answers the case, but am obliged to have 
recourse to everyone's feeling, in order to g!ye him a 
perfect notion of this operation of the mind. J 
Here belief is a feeling or sentiment, an act or 
attitude of the mind, a way of viewing an object as existent. 
Belief is not merely a specific degree of vivacity 'of our per-
ceptions. Belief is rather a class of complex states of affairs, 
ith several distinguishing marks. Such marks are a vivid idea, 
steady conception, customary aSSOCiation, constancy and coherence. 
12 Ibid., (116). 
13 1, Appendix to Book III, (624; 
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A sufficient number of the marks must be present in a sufficient 
degree. 14 
The investigation of belief as merely a degree of 
vivacity leads us to our second question. In the opening sen-
tences of the Treatise, and many times there&fter, Hume speaks of 
the difference between impressi.ons and ideas as one merely of 
degree in force and liveliness. However, the difference appears 
also to be one in kind, for "it sometimes happens, that our 
impressions are so faint and lo~ , that we cannot distinguish them 
from our ideas."15 If vivacity alone constituted the difference 
be tween them, impressions could not be so faint, nor ideas so 
vivid, that the one would be mistaken for the other~. 
In his account of belief Hume introduces a significant 
exception. A sufficiently lively idea may on occasion instigate 
a belief. The idea "supplies the place of an impreSSion, and 
is entirely the same, so far as regards our present purpose.1f16 
14 This is put rather pOintedly by MacNabb, David 
~ume, 80; "It is a mark of belief that the idea believed is 
~ividly imagined and holds our involuntary attention; it is 
~ mark of bel ief that the idea beli eved is s teady and habitual; 
it is a mark of belief that the steady conception of the idea 
comes with the click of custom in suitable conditions; it is 
~ mark of belief that we feel and act as would be appropriate ' 
~f the idea were true. Hume describes these marks very well. 
~t no one of them ••• is by itself a necessary or sufficient 
criterion of genuine belief; rather a sufficient number of the 
~arks must be present in a sufficient degree." 
15 T, i, 1 (2). 
16 T, iii, 8 (106). 
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In other words, we can know that a perception is an idea even 
though we do not know it as representing or subsequent to an 
impression, even though the perception, as apprehended, is 
as vivid as an impression and gives rise to beliefs. 17 
This ambiguity is partly explained by the emphasis on 
"vivacity" as preparatory to the revolutionary doctrine of belief ' 
Hume wished to establish two things: that ideas are copies of 
impressions, and therefore a process of enlivening can raise 
an idea, to the\belief status of an impression. But if the 
careful conclusions of the philosopher are to be distinguished 
from the vivid fancies of the enthusiast, another factor must 
be considered. This is the "force and settled order" of impres-
sions. The correct criterion of impressions is not merely 
liveliness, but also coherence. When the difference between 
impressions and ideas is blurred, it is those perceptions which 
have constancy and coherence that are called impressions. 
Our third question concerns "Custom." Hume employs 
17 Especially clear on this point is J. A. Passmore, 
Hum-e's Intentions, Cambridge, 1952, 96: "Thus, we can !mow that 
a per'ception is an 'idea' even though 
l l~ We do not know it as representing an impression. 2 'We do not know it as subsequent to an impression. \ 3 It is quite as vivid as an impression. 4 It gives rise to beliefs in the same way as an 
impression. Hume relies on the fact that, as he puts it, levery 
one of himself will readily perceive the distinction betwixt 
feeling and thinking'; he fails seriously to ask himself the 
crucial question--c0uld we make this distinction if we were 
acquainted with nothing but perceptions?" . 
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the terms~custom, habit, instinct, propensity, and principle, 
rather indiscriminately. At best the terms can be distinguished · 
in this way • . Instinct and propensity usually refer to some 
innate power or inclin~tion. Cus tom and habit can refer to 
developed or acquired inclinations, tendencies, and ways of 
acting. In the doctrine of ~elief, custom and h~bit are not 
used in the sense of the conventional mores of a people. 
Custom and habit can be distinguished in this way. 
Cus tom more properly refers, to the objective fact of the regular 
r epetition of an action or event. Custom is certainly employed 
i n this sense in Hume. Habit refers to a subjective disposition, 
or developed power or capacity. A person can rise habituallY 
at an early hour without having the habit, the disposition, the 
i nclination of rising early. Hume employs the word habit not 
merely to signifJ the objective fact of repetition or habitual 
ways of actin-g, but also to ind·icate a disposition or inclination 
s o to act. 18 
18 Habit can also be considered in several senses. 
A. Habit in the sense of biological and physical adaptation con-
sists in the fact that a being retains a modification from a 
certain action. If the action is repeated, the being i{ill tend 
to be modified the same way in successive actions. 
B. Habit can mean the spontaneous repetition of that which is 
first caused by external causes~ This is exemplified in the 
acquisition of la.nguage and customs. 
C. Habit in the psycholog1cal sense can mean the conscious 
acquiring by exercise of the power of doing that of which one 
was formerly incapable. This implies the gradual disappearance 
of consciousness together with an increase in automatit operation • 
. " 
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C~tom and habit, t hen, are the ultim&tes ~'hich 
Hume has run up against in several points in his arg~~ent. 
Rea son ccnnot expla in any of the basic facts of 0ur experience. 
The altern&tive is not sceptici sm t:ut beli efs 1-fhi ch are n.sturc.l 
and inevitabl e. The princi pl e operating to produce beliefs is 
custom: 'liTis not, therefore, reason, "Which i s '.. he guide of life, 
but custom. That alone determines the mind, in all instances, to 
suppo se the future conformable to the past. However easy this 
s tep may seem, reason would never, to all eternity, be able to 
make it.,,19 
Custom is the non-rati cnal propensity to repeat the 
same operation. 20 This definition does not explain all that 
Hume wants it t o explain. The principle of a s s oci2.tion of id.ea s 
or the habi t to repeat an opera tion i s not enough to explain 
something more than a memory belief. To bridge the gap between 
what 'Hould be a mere memory belief and what a ctually is expec-
In this sense we speak of a habit of self-control, t he habit of 
reflection before thinking. 
Of these three meanings of habit , Hume usually means 
habit in sense B, while perhaps including sense A. Habit in 
sense C implies volition and thus is not appl i cable to belief 
or causal inference. 
The matter of this footnote was borrowed liberally 
rom L&.lande, Vocabulaire Technique et Cri tigue ~ .LA Philosophie 
Paris, 1947, 378-384. 
19 Abstract, 16. 
20 ~,V, i (37). 
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tation, Hume appeals to the presumption that' the future will be 
conformable to the past. This habit is referred to as a "species 
of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to 
oursel~es."~l He also speaks of a "kind of pre-established 
harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our 
i deas; and though , the powers apd forces, by which the former is 
governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and concep-
t ions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the 
other works of nature.,,22 This "correspondence ••• so 
necessary to the subsistence of our species" is effected by 
custom. 23 
Custom then names both the principle of association of 
i deas in the sense of the tendency to repeat the associated ideas 
and the instinctive presumption that the future will resemble 
the past. Under this estimc,te, reason in the sense of the 
imagination: 
is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in 
our souls ••• ,This instinct, 'tis true, arises from 
past observation 'and experience; but can anyone give 
the ultimate reason, why past experience and observation 
produces such an e5fect any more than why nature alone 
shou'd produce it? 4 
21 E, IX (88). 
22 ~, V, ii (46). 
23 ' .I,W. 
24 lJ ili, 16 (179). 
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In~brief, Kuma believes it was the wisdom of Nature 
. which provided us with a principle more secure and ready to 
perform a fUnction so essential to the subsistence of human 
I beings than is the uncertain process of reasoning. Inference 
from cause to effect could not be trusted to the nfallacious 
deductions of our reason. n25 Nature has taught us to use our 
arms and legs without' providing ' usvith the scientist's knowledge 
of nerves and muscles. Put in biological terms" "the tendency 
to ' expect repetitions of what has repeatedly occurred is 
general and indispensable adaptation of living organisms to an 
environment subject tolaws. n26 
This again illustrates the parallel suggested by N. 
Kemp Smith. Just as the fundamental . judgments of morals rest 
on feeling, and as in moral matters Nb.ture has provide,d us with 
, , 
"immediate monitors," so, our judgments in matters of fact are 
acts of belief, and belief like any other ' passion is predetermined 
by the constitution of our nature. 
This is another echo of the biological interpretation 
of belief. Care must be had here lest the evolutionary era's 
emphasis on bio,logy be foisted on Hume. Perhaps much of his 
tloctrine on custom, habit, and principles of nature could be 
!traced to the humanistic influence of classicbl ' Roma.n literature 
25 E, V, ii (47). 
26 MacNabb, "Hume 
De Philoso hie Bruxelles V 
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and philos"bphy. However, there are indications thc.t Hume vaguely 
foreshadowed the modern empiricist's emphasis on the biological 
interpretation of human knowledge and behavior. 
The great emphasis on association, the mechanical 
connection between perceptions, clearly indicate Hume's debt to 
Newton. Hume explicitly prof~ssed the desire to be the Newton of 
1 . 27 the mora SClences. But he also supplemented the mechanical 
connection between perceptions with various instinctive propensi-
ties. These various propensities are a witness to Hutcheson's 27 
emphasis on the passions, or instinctive feelings. Bume considers 
reason to be nothing but a "wonderful and unintelligible in-
stinct."2~ This instinct "arises from past observation and 
experience. ,,29 
To say that past observation and experience begets 
or develops an instinct is to come very close to saying that 
the instinct results from the necessity of man . to adapt ·to the 
needs of his environment. Also, Hume considers it more conforma-
ble to the wisdom of nature to se'cure such an important operation 
as causal inference by "some instinct or mechanical tendency.n30 
27 T, i, 4 (12-13). 
28 T, iii, 16 (179). 
29 Ibid. 
30 I, V, 11 (47). 
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All in all," "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions.")l 
Therefore, even if or when reason operates as something 
more than an instinct, reason is always subject to that which is 
instinctive. The supreme functioning power in man is that which 
is wholly instinctive, passion. or feeling. Finally, in Bume's 
system, belief assumes within its scope a great deal which was 
previously accorded to knowledge. And belief is apparently some-
thing common to the species since belief is predetermined 
independently of the individualts experience. "Nature has 
de termined us to judge just as it has determined us to breathe 
and to feel."32 
The above facts lend support to the contention that 
wi thin Hume can be found adumbrations of the modern pragmatic 
and behavioristic stress on the biological interpretation of 
human action and knowledge. Ho\.'ever, the contention is prefaced 
with the clear admission that Hmae did not explicitly accept and 
assert the biological interpretation. 
Belief and causality must now be related in the 
structure of Bume's philosophy. The questions just posed re-
vealed bolO significant leads. Belief is a certain atti tude of 
the believer. Belief demands certain qualities in the believed: 
31 T, II, iii, 3 (415). 
32 Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 46. 
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belief-pungency or vividness, and systematic coherence of 
perceptions. 
Perhaps the best approach is to set forth the twin 
beliefs which operate on differenct levels: the belief that 
objects have B- continuing, independent existence and the belief 
that the thus constituted Qodies are causally operative on one 
another. These beliefs refer us to a large number of objects 
which go to make up a system or world. Since there is no 
distinct idea of existence, existence or reality then must refer 
to perceptions, their very givenness, and will be applicable to 
anything else in so tar as they are assimilable to these 
perceptions. 
These existences form a "system. n This system inclUdes 
all that we believe to exist, especially all unobserved tacts. 
Thus the desk and the history book, the man next door and Julius 
Caesar, New York and Shanghai, all form a part of the syste~. 
When the porter brings me a letter I suppose all the intermediate 
existents between me and my friend across the seas ~o wrote me 
the letter.)) 
In the more technical language of Hume, this durable, 
inevitably believed, world or system will include impressions 
of sense and reflection, impressions of memory, and their causal 
~ssociates. "Impressions always actuate the soUl and that in the 
JJ L iv, 2 (196). 
, 
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highest deg~ee.n34 The highest degree of conviction, or belief, 
is native to sense perception. The awareness proper to immediate 
perceptions carries with it the assurance of an unchallengeable 
and de facto type of certainty. "Ideas of the memory" or 
memories of sense-perceptions can be considered "equivalent to 
[sense] impressions. n35 Any reality, then, has the bel ief status 
which is a memory or sense impression or assimilable with such 
i mpressions. 36 
This basic conviction-attitude can be transferred to 
other objects. There are two requisites: a vividness approach-
i ng the firm tang of sense impressions, a constancy and coherence 
with the sy s tem of sense impressions. To believe is to allocate 
t o a place in this system. 37 
, On the first level is belief in an external world. 
This means belief in things that persist when we are not senSing 
t hem. The perSistence of things is not a datum of sense because 
we are not always senSing them. Nor is their independence a part 
34 T, iii, 10 (118). 
35 T, iii, 4 (82). 
36 Hore str.1.ctly, there is inunediate awareness of 
present impressions. There is belief only of objects not present 
in sense data, but which have the same force and liveliness as 
present sense data. 
37 Passmore, Hume1s Intent1ons, 99-102. 
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of the presented content. Percey tions ~r e fl eeting, subj8ctive, 
perishing. Various interrupted appearances give similar percep-
tions, which are associ~ ted by the law of resemblance. The 
memories of i ~~ipressions are infected wi th the same belief-
quality as the original impressions. When the successive memory 
impressions are run together into one i dea, this idea receives 
the memorial belief that was attached to the impressions. The 
imagination easily fills the gaps to form the idea of a 
continuing · object. The continuance of the object leads us to 
regard it as independent. 38 
The second system, or second level of belief, consists 
exclusively of causal associa tion. We find by experience "that 
belief arises only from causation, cmd that we can draw no 
inference from one object to another, except they be connected 
by this relation. n39 Ideas can gain the full belief status 
only through causal association with the system of impressions. 
It is only because belief has first -operated in sense perception 
that it still carries us to the actually existent when it 
operates through causal inference. 
Our picture is now slightly more detailed. The reality 
38 T, iv, 2 (181-218); H. H. Price, Hume's Theory 
of The External World, Oxford, 1940, especially 11-37. Price 
goes far beyond Hurne in the explanations proposed in the 
latter part of this book. 
39 T, iii, 8 (107). 
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feeling suffuses all iml-'I'essions of sense and memory. \Oie believe 
\ihatever is necessarily connected with an existent &150 exi5ts. 
Associ&tion gently and smoothly le&ds us to believe in an 
external world of continuing independent bodies. The only 
absent objects which enter our system are the causal compani ons 
of impressions. The causal companions borrow their belief 
quality or vigor from the impressions. This is the ~orld of 
HUlne, a "real world" of inter-connected perc€i:- tions, und these 
are the objects at which his twin beliefs arrive. 
-.. 
CHAPTER IV 
CRITICISM OF HUME'S CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY 
The criticism of this chapter will be centered on 
three topics: various object~ons to Hume's analysis of cause, 
t he association mechanism, the critical acceptance of customs. 
In place of the intellectual grasp of causality, Hume 
has substituted a theory of belief. But to account for the assent 
given to ideas reached by way of causal inference, Hume must 
no t merely explain why they are assented to, but also why they 
alone are thus accepted by the mind. Hume must explain: nCa) 
how we come to believe that some objects are causally connected 
without believing that others are, (b) how we distinguish cause 
fr om effect, or (c) how causal connection differs from the 
connection of qualities in an object."l 
The most obvious, trite, and nonetheless as yet 
unanswered objection is this. Causality is one of the three 
natural relations of association. Why then does causality alone 
l ead to belief, while resemblance and contiguity merely suggest 
I Monroe C. Beardsley, "A Dilemma for Hurne," The 
Philosophi~al Review, New York, LII, January, 1943, 40. 
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connections between objects? Instances of c~us81 relation are 
also instances of contiguity. If contiguity suffices to account 
for the as sociati,on of ideas in any instance, it suffices in the 
causal instance. 
Hume foresees the objection and treats it to some 
2 
extent. He regards resemblance and contiguity as supporting 
his theory of belief. For if mere resemblance and contiguity 
have some effect in enlivening ideas, how much more so an invari-
able relation should enliven ideas. "The objects" which the 
rela tion of cause and effect presents "are fixt arId unalterable." 
The singular nature of cause and effect is due to the invaria-
bility or constant uniformity of the conjoined objects which are 
causes and effects. 
On the part of the objects, this is no more than 
constant contiguity and succession. Now it is true that by 
definition causality differs from contiguity, since in casual 
conjunction, in addition to the objective constant conjunction, 
there is the subjective felt necessity. The precise point at 
issue is why there is a felt necessity in the one case of constan 
conjunction and not in another. That there is a constant 
conjunction, that there is a transition, that there is a felt 
2 . I, iii, 9 (106-110). 
3 Ibid., (110). 
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necessity"", Hume rightly asserts. But once "power" is subtracted 
from objects, there is no explanation of why the mind asserts 
necessity. 
, There are instances of constant conjunction in which 
the mind neither feels nor projects a necessary connection 
between the ' conjoined object~: the succession of night and day, 
the front and back of a house, the lighting of a cigarette anq 
the drawing of smoke. And on the other hand there are instances 
of a felt determination or projection of necessary connection in 
objects which are not constantly conjoined: the striking and the 
flaming of very unreliable matches; the taking of medicine and 
the relief from pain. 
Further, Hume's explanation of our belief in necessary 
connection depends upon s?owtng that the imagination relates 
impressions according to the modes of ,contiguity and succession 
before it relates them causally, and as a condition for so 
relating them. Constant conjunction refers to 'all that is 
afforded by experience as a ground for any causal belief. Con-
tiguity and succession define conjunction, and are consequently 
of some import. Hume regards them at first as essential to 
causation, but progressively neglects them. 
Contiguity is both spatial and temporal. Billiard 
balls are obviously spatially contiguous, and Hume concentrates 
on this example in the Enq~rY. But the taste and amell of a 
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piece of fl1lit are not spatially contiguous with that piece of 
f ruit. The fruit is in space but the smell and taste are 
"nowhere," according to the doctrine of secondary qualities. 
The spatial inherence of the smell in the object is inferred 
after their necessary connection is established.4 The flame 
and the attendant heat, the te~sile strength and the metal 
(any property and its substance) cannot properly be regarded as 
spatially contiguous. 
Temporal contiguity can mean either that the objects 
exist for a time contemporaneously or that the cause-object 
must appear just before the effect-object. The first interpre-
t ation makes contiguity to mean mere togetherness in experience. 
The second is reducible to succession, which is the temporal 
priority of the cause to the effect. 
Temporal priority is not a universal element. 
Impressions do not necessarily have to come just before ideaS. 
Suppose a man alrrays saw smoke in his experience before he sa.w 
f ire, or always heard the train whistle before he saw the train. 
The first element in the experience is not necessarily the cause 
of the subsequently experienced, nor is it thought to be so. If 
temporal priority is a necessary element of causation, there is 
no explanation why the mind can go from effect to cause as well 
4 T, iv, 5 (237). 
i 1 ;1 
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as from cause to effect. 
The difficulty becomes a dilemma when objects are 
always experienced simultaneously: stes.m and the bubbling of 
'fater; the feeling of heat and the appearance of flame on 
entering a room. There i~ the classic example of the heavy book 
and the soft cush\ on. 5 When we let the book fall, the cushion 
s inks under it. The interval between cause and effect 1s 
s carcely discrirninable. wnich came first, the sinking of the 
cushion or the pressing of the book? Logical analYSiS, and not 
phenomenal discrimination, indicates that it is not merely the 
appearance but the activity of the objects which must be 
considered. 
Conjunction in the sense of cont1guity a.nd succession 
i s apparently an unessential condition of causal belief. The 
undes1rable conclusion is that mere repeated appearance in 
experience is a sufficient ground of causal belief. There should 
t hen be no more compulsion to feel necessity in the flame causing 
t he heat, than that the wall causes the window, the chair causes 
5 This is alluded to in Beardsley, "A Dilemma for 
Hume," 37: "In considering this reply, we may select a classic 
example in which the interval between cause and effect is per-
haps not discriminable: we hold a heavy book level with the 
upper surface of a soft cushion, just touching it, and then we 
let the book fall as the cushion sinks beneath it. Does the 
cushion sink after the book presses it, or at the same time? 
This question arises whenever the cause appears to operate along 
with the effect; the book presses, the cushion sinks: which is 
earlier? And, ~hen, which is the cause and which effect?n 
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the room, the heat causes the flame, the one half of the slipper 
ccuses the other unobserved half. 
The examples are not intenc1ed as c:. bit of undergradua te 
cleverness. Hume himself has said on more than one occasion: 
"Anything ::na.y produce anything.,,6 This must mean th.st the 
s pe cies of object X which regularly appears with or after any 
other s pecies of object Y will come to be believed the effect 
of Y. Instances to the contrary have been asserted before. 
The appeal to constant conjunction was intended to 
explain why particUla'r causes have particular effects. Tl::.ere 
is the more general question ofW'hy every event has a cause, 
which Hume decided "to sink" in the question \Thy particular 
causes have particular effects. i{hen I hear a b&ng, two ques-
tions arise, why I believe thc:..t the bang has some cause or other 
and vhy I believe that the bang was caused by a slamming door. 
The answer to the second question is that the belief arises from 
the association of that type of noise \;ith the particular visual 
datum of a slamming door. But how does this explanation serve 
for the first question? How could cus tom associate the bang 
with "something or other." 
Humets answer is in the section on the probability of 
causes. 7 Philosophers and scientists observe the complexity of 
nature and realize that "chance" occurrences may proceed from 
7 T, iil, 12. 
-
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cGDc e(j le d. countsr Ci ctine CE.uses . Further, O LAr generc, l succe s s 
i n o.i s cove2' ine r egul a ri tie s , r el E. ti on s of exE. ct and unVc. r fing 
dependence, is roughly pr ovortion2t e to the minutenes s Lnd extent 
of t he observations that we cen ~ake. Either the propensity 
of eXf-:ect c: ncy is already pres ent, i s ir...na te in the constitution 
of our na tu:o e, or :-:l2.ny se ts of ·conj oined 0 bj ects, many cE,usal 
i nstances, gener~lize our sens e of e x~ ec tancy. 
The su~position of a 8 eneral, innate propensity of 
expectancy would seem to be an ad hoc hypothesis. Also this 
hypothesis would some',rha t vi tia te Hume' s explanation of the 
particular causal inference as a mental determination resulting 
from the experience of constant conjunction. The alternative 
explanation, that many sets of conjoined objects generalize 
our sense of expectancy, involves considerable difficulty. 
For, granted that the principle of causality is not 
innate and requires at least one experience of causation for the 
formulation of the principle, yet it is difficult to see how the 
repeated experience of associated events can generate the 
principle. The repeated association of objects gives us accumu-
lation of experience. The accumulation, of itself, does not 
compel us to make the necessary judgment: "Something must have 
caused the banging noise." And how can a given event, a noise, 
become as sociated with a general "something or other"? Hume's 
explanation leads us to consider the role played by association. 
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For the "Newton of the meral sciences," associations 
are "the cement of the universe."S HO'rlever, the association 
me chanism does not explain all the facts Hume would like it to 
explain. Burne never disavo~s his basic associationist scheme. 
Yet wher e the mechanicc.l connection of perceptions begin,s\to 
feil, Burne a plJ ea.ls to various '.lvropensities" of. the soul. 
Each propensity is a concession and a deviation from his basic 
empiricist and associationist pattern. These concessions will 
not be enumerated here. The instartces of the natural beliefs 
are sufficient. 
Causal connection fits in neatly with the association-
ist pattern. The causal relation is reducible to the repetition 
of similar conjunctions. Under the influence of association, 
the mind passes from one percepti on to another. But even here 
there is the "irregular" propensity which accounts for the mind' s 
projection of necessity into the perceptions themselves. Also, 
the transfer of vivacity is not wholly mechanical. It depends 
on the "propensity of the imagination. n9 
The mechanical links between ideas cannot of them-
selves generate ideas. 10 In the case of independent and 
8 Abstract, 32. 
9 T, iv, 2 (208). 
10 See Passmore, Hume's Intentions, 121: "We unite our 
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continuous existence, the fiction of continued existence is 
ascribed to another propensity, the propensity of the mind for 
creating fictions to overcome the sensible uneasiness due to 
the interruptedness of our ~ ercepticns. 
Further, does the principle of associction explain or 
g en~ ra te ideas? ~1ore consis ten tly " .. i th Hllille' s philosophy the 
principle stc. tes the conai tions under which we find the beliefs 
to occur, though Hume's extended treatment would incline one to 
believe that these mechanisms themselves explain the origin of 
our beliefs in causal connection and independent existence. 
In the instance of causality, the principle can 
scarcely say more than that certain perceptions (impressions and 
i deas or objects) are constantly conjoined and that there is an 
attendant belief. To say more would invite the cry of "vicioUS 
circle." The associative principle cannot state that elements 
in association are the cause of belief, or that the vivacity of 
the impression is the cause o~ the belief in the corresponding 
object or idea. Summarily, the associative principle states the 
circumstances or conditions of repea ted conjunction. 
perceptions, he suggests, 'by the fict i on of a continued exist-
ence' in order to reconcile the facility with which we pass from 
one perception to another with their actual interruptedness. 
Thus yet another 'propensity' is invoked; the mind when confronted 
by contradictions feels 'a sensible uneasiness'; it creates 
fictions in order to overcome this uneasiness. 'The mechanical 
links between our ideas could not of themselves generate fictions: 
the co-operation of 'our mind' is vital, as we have already seen, 
and as Hume here substanti~lly admits." 
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ff the as socia tive me chanisms, or principle s , mean 
mor e t han a ~ta tement of the conditions of repeated conjunction, 
they are subj ect to the s&me cri tique \~-hl t eheaci l evels 8. t 
"habit.!! "It is difficult to understand I,Thy Hwne exempts 'h2blt' 
from the same cr iticism as that a pplied to the notion 'cause.' 
We have no 'impression' of 'habit,' just 8.S we have no 'impre s -
sion' of 'cau se.' Cause, repetition, habit are all in the same 
boat."ll 
A habit or associative mechani sm is something 'Hhich we 
infer. These principles are not immediately experienced; there 
is no impression of habit or of an as sociative mechani sm. 
Certainly an impression of a permanent habit or pr i nciple would 
be as difficult to account for as an impression of a permanent 
SUbstance. Impressions for Hume are individual and self-con-
tained. Therefore, a habit can only be an aggregate of the 
s eparate and independent expectings or transitions which are 
attached each to a particular pair of impressions in a Single 
psychical history. The same can be said of any principle or 
"mind" which is invoked as an enduring element in the explanation 
of psychical conjunction. 
. . 
11 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, New York, 
1941, 213. 
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In final view, perh&ps it is better to consider the 
na t ur ul beli ef s as ultim&te s . Deeper f&cts or expl anations ~ay 
be pre sent in reality, but we i o not attain them. Associ &tion 
does not exactly expl ain the beliefs. The natural beliefs are 
r ega rded a s f acts; all expl anations of t hes e "facts" are on the 
level of hypothesis. 12 The natural beli efs are the central 
positions t o be defended at any cost. The psychological 
mechanisms through which Hume attempts to explain the natural 
beliefs, are the military outposts. l ] Such terms as principle 
of as sociation, custom, habit, are an indirect homage to 
metaphysical unity and an avowal of the impotence of pure 
empiricism. 14 
12 T, iv, 2 (206-207). 
I] This is elaborated in Smith, The PhilosophY of 
David Hume, 225: "To employ a military metaphor: if the 
'natural beliefs' be regarded as central ,pos i tions to be held 
a t all costs,they can be defended either by themselves or by 
means of supporting outposts. If Hume's psychological mecha-
nisms--through which he seeks to explain t he natural beliefs in 
Book I and the indirect passions in Book II--be taken as 
representing such outposts, it is these forward positions that he 
has chosen to do much of his philosophical fighting; and ' he has 
certainly been almost as eagerly concerned to defend them for 
their own sakes, as by their aid to secure the capital positions 
in the rear." 
14 Harechal states this in a short passage of unusual 
i~sight. Joseph Marechal, S. J., Le Point de Depart De La 
Metaphysigue, Paris, 1942, II, 242: "Ou encore, entre les suc-
cession d'impressions et d'idees, ce sera L'habitude active 
qUi, jettera, comme un trait d'union, Ie lien dyn~~ique de causal-
, • • I ~ , • ite. Enfin les discont~nu~tes et les eclip@es d'une exper~ence 
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Belief has definitely sho\-In itself to be 1{hat Hume said 
it was, "more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the 
cogitative part of our natures. nlS But the custom which 
accounts for belief also accounts for excessive beliefs, for 
propaganda and prejudice. 
To curb excessive over-beliefs and, at the same time, 
the unguarded tendency to seek for a sufficient cause, Hume 
relies upon a moderate scepticism in philosophy. In the conduct 
of life one must choose between superstition and philosophy. 
"And in this respect I make bold to recommend philosophy. ,,16 
Besides the reason which is a wonderful instinct, Hume holds an 
analytic reason supplying a criterion in the absence of which 
his distinction between fact and fiction, between objective and 
subjective, between the best thought-out sCientlfic belief and 
the crudest superstition, could have no legitimate meaning. The 
natural beliefs are legitimate only within a strictly limited 
If · 
trop courte se combleront ta;t bien que ma1 . ~~~ 11empietement 
de,cette Icroyance l , qui cree dans la dlverslte ondoyante des 
idees la stabl1ite d'une 'valeur en soil. Les termes s1 souvent 
r~petes par Hume, de 'custom', 'habit', 'belief or assentl, sont 
autant d'hommages indirects a l'unlte metaphyslque et d'aveux 
d'lmpulssance de l'emplrls.me pur. En les pressant un peu, on en 
verralt sourdre les notions metaphyslques de Is~eclfication' ou 
de 'causa1l te forme1le', .de 'flna11 te', et d' I etre' ." 
15 I, lV, 1 (183). 
16 ~, lv, 7 (271). 
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domain, "tfte experienced train of events." Custom is king only 
insofar as it conforms to experience. And it is the invaria-
bility and consequent universality of experience, apparently, 
that is the supreme norm. 
The scientifically minded man frames his generaliza-
tions in accord with observed .constant conjunctions. The 
superstitious man generalizes according to whim and fancy. This 
i s Hume's way of meeting the fact that not all regularities are 
r eliable, not all customs good customs. 
The problem of legitimating this criterion is not easy. 
Reasoning based on causal inference goes beyong the evidence of 
t he senses. For Hume this does not mean that causation unveils 
t he meaning of the sense data; but that reason outruns the 
evidence. This makes causal inference to rest on natural 
compulsion. Now if custom and belief operate naturally, 
i nstinctively, how can reason correct or adjust the results? 
Belief ~follows inevitablY and in proportion to the number of 
experiences of objects. If belief or custom is erroneous in 
some cases, why should we trust it in any? And if it operates 
.\ 
naturally, how are we free to correct its results in one instance, 
. without being free to reject all its fallacious results? 
The basis on which reason supplements custom is 
apparently assumed .as an ultimate. The question of miracles is 
a good practical instance. Uniformity of experience is the 
generator of bel'-ef'. Therefore our belief, says Hume, should 
be proportioned to the uniformity of experience. But if belief 
should arise without uniformity of experience, why should we 
a ttempt to control it? The very fact th~t belief arises without 
uniformity of experience, shows that belief' can be had without 
i t, and therefore there is no general rule governing the case. 
I 
Reason can give no evidence for insisting one accept only 
uniformity. In the framework of Hume's philosophy, I am deter-
mined to believe. The only reason Hume could offer for making 
uniformity the criterion was that uniformity is 'constantlY 
conjoined with belief. This is not the case. 
The developed instrumentalism of John Dewey proffers 
a more satisfying justification. If we consider belief in its 
biological, functional aspect, then those beliefs are to be 
accepted which satisfy the problems and needs of our environment, 
those beliefs are to be accepted which fit into the "world" of 
realities composed of our two systems of beliefs. Perhaps Hume 
wa s tending toward this type of coherence theory. It is, in 
turn, open to the relativist charges leveled against all 
matism and instrumentalism. 
The inquiry conducted 1n th1schapter reveals 
Humets constructive theory is shaky at several points. The 
chapter was not intended as a complete "refutation of Hume." 
Humets analysis, ot cause and his theory of' belief are the 
• positive complement of his rejection of the rationality ot causal 
i nference. The difficulities encountered in this positive 
counter-proposal urge us to reconsider the arguments and premises 
upon which Hume based his rejection of the knowability ot the 
causal principle and causal inference. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE PREMISES 
Chapter IV was a critique of Hume's positive doctrine 
as explained in Chapter III. The difficulties and objections 
against Hume's positive theory of belief invite are-evaluation 
of Hume's critical theory of causation. In other words, since 
the theory of belief is not wholly satisfactory, and since- the 
t heory of belief was an alternative elected after Hume's critique 
of causation, the validity of that critique must be reconsidered. 
~hapter V is largely an analysis of the Humean rejection of 
causality proposed in Chapter II. 
Throughout the positive exposition a number of proposi-
tions fundamental to Hume's epistemology have been noted. These 
~ropositions can be tabulated here under seven headings. This 
tabulation is neutral as far as causality is concerned. The list 
~erely purports to include the major assumptions of Hume's 
~pistemology.l Further analysis of subsequent paragraphs and a 
second tabulation will indicate which of these assumptions bear 
pn the criticism of causality. 
1 At least one proposition, that concerning abstract 
ideas or universals, was not mentioned before, but is included 
to round out the list. 
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The assumptions are: 
That experience can be an~lyzed into simple components. 
~. That every i dea is &n exact copy of a corresponding impres-
pi on. 
(y. 
) . 
p. 
That what is distinguishcble is separable. 
Tha t verceptions are the objects of knowledge. 2 
Tha t the scope of knm.rledge is limi ted to rela tions of ideas • . 
That a general idea is merely a particular one plus a habit 
pf associ.stion. 
~. That the principle of attraction is the basis of association. 
Which, if any, of these assumptions underlie Hume's 
~ritical arguments? The denial of the self-evidence of the 
principle of causality rested on Hume' s view- or the extent of 
~owledge. l'he assertion that the principle of cb.usali ty is 
~ndemonstrable rests on his atomism: that what is distinguishable 
~s separable. Again both of these proofs rest on a third general 
principle: the contradictory of any matter of fact is not 
mpossible. Hence propositions regarding cause and effect are 
pot certain. 
In particular instances of causality, two factors :. 
~ender causal implication unknowable: the dogma that what is 
2 Hume slips back and forth from the language of the 
~henomenalist to the language of the realist, and cannot there-
~ore be called a phenomenalist without qualification. This 
phapter attempts to show how his phenomenalist bent influenced 
his rejection of causality. 
J 
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lti __ tingui!:Oli<J.bl ~ is sP l; 2r c-_ble , c,nc. the f<....ilur e t o ~""r..e trc t e real 
e:::s en l!es. This seconu fb ctor i s i1 necEssc!rJ coroll(c. ~y of the 
re j ection of th e ;:.irinciple o:f cc:. us&li ty. 
The consequent s earch for t he origin of necess&ry 
corulection tur ns on two points: the conclu~ion that reason 
ci:J.nnot demons tre:.: te a necessary. connection; and the ;)rinci ple 
tha t ideas are copies of impre ss ions, ~nd that reason even aided 
by experience cannot produce a new idea for which there is no 
antecedent impression. 
These are the assumptions conducive to the rejection 
of causality. The doctrine of belief, in turn, depends on this 
critical part of Hume's philosophy. For it is precisely because 
t he causal inference is non-logical and the concept of power is 
non-em~irical, that Hume ~ seeks another avenue to reality, an 
assertion of the concrete "inferred" existent. This mode of 
attaining reality is belief. The assumptions of the critical 
part, then affect the whole of Hume's philosophy, for Hume 
would not have been so concerned with expounding belief it 
concrete reality could be grasped with strict rational certitude. 
From the above analysis, precisely those assumptions 
which lead to the rejection of causality can now be listed: 
1. The scope of knowledge is limited to relations between ideas, 
the four philosophical relations enumerated. 
2. What is distinguishable is separable. 
'" 
u '. 
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3. The con~radictory or the law of causality is not self-
contradictory. 
4. Ideas are exact copies of corresponding impressions. 
: From this point on caution becomes the watchword. 
~~ile admitting that Hume employs all of the above assumptions, 
there are a number of commentators who believe that his con-
clusions are independent of his chief psychological dogmas: 
This may explain why 1t is sometimes thought 
sufficient to make out Hume's scepticism as deriving 
exclusively from his principle that a simple idea must 
be the copy of a corresponding impression. Failing to 
find an impression of necessary connection, he deni es 
that we have any such idea. This misses not only the 
actual conclusion of Hume's critical analysis of causa-
tion, but also his arguments to that conclusion from the 
impotence of apagogic reasoning in the matter, as well 
as the analytic efficacy of the rurther principle that 
what is distinguishable is separable; in effect, the 
substance or Hume's position in this regard. j 
,< 
I' 
; 
I 
According to Church, then, the conclusion that ~fagogic 
reasoning is powerless in matters of existence remains independent 
of the doctrine of impressions ~nd ideas and of the theory of 
philosophical relations. Equally independent is Humels failure 
to find necessary connections among :natters of fa.ct. 
Church' 5 analysis 1001:5 a Ii ttle li .t~e an atterript to 
reh8bi li t bte Brune. Perha ps lt ~s pos s i bl e t o r.:: j ect cctu.:;&lity 
or obj ective nece s sary connection Yl ithout wholly acce fi ting Hwue
'
,; 
psychol ogy. HO'..;rever, t he uernc:, l cf nece ssb ry connecti on, t he 
203 . 
3 Ralph Church, Hume I 5 T~le ory of the Uncie r 5t uld ing, 
I' 
~O 
~ 
denial of implic8tion bet-ween C0use a.nci. effect, -rfould seem to 
i mply some sort of 2 tomi sm or phenomenali sm. Tni s is the 
posi tion 'rihich the argumenta tion of thi s Ch&pteI· ,·;ill attempt to 
develop . 
Ea.ch of the a ssu:n:.; tions "Will be weighed in turn. The 
scope of YJ1owl edge, or the exclusion of certainty from the area 
of exi s tents, hinges on this: the contrarj of every matter of 
fa ct is still possible. The moon could be ~,OOO or 200,000 niles 
di stCint from us. Our idea of the moon would relne.in the same. 
Hlli~e admits a type of de facto certainty involved in the immediate 
awaren~ss of our perceptions. The shadow of uncertainty encloses 
us when we go beyond the data of immediate perception to indepen-
dently existent and causally operative bodies and selves. 
For Hume, the perception ~ does not imply an 
i ndependently existing tree. The perception tree does not imply 
an original seed or shoot from which it grew. The perception is 
j ust there in my consciousness. I cannot go beyond it. This 
view of knowledge would seem to imply a reason which cannot 
cooperate with the data of sensation, and a phenomenal and 
atomistic object of experience. 
The second assumption is that what is distinguishable 
i s separable. Hume admits that the mind cannot attain to any 
other existential act than that of perceptions. Because the 
atomic elements of experience can be analyzed in the state of 
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isolated i~dependence, they are regarded as loose and unconnected 
either with each other or with any "external" mode of existence. 
Again, though his atomism cannot be said to be deduced strictly 
from his phenomenali s tic outlook, nonetheless pe rceptual 
phenomenalism offers fertile soil for the growth of this type of 
atomism. It is an easier matter to consider ideas and impres-
sions as isolated and independent than so to regard independent 
ontological wholes in an ordered universe. 
The third assumption, the incompetence of demonstra-
t ive reasoning in matters of fact, has been regarded by some as 
independent of the psychological dogmas. However, it is the 
basis for Hume's view of the extent ot knowledge. For, since 
a Tact can always be otherwise than it is, Hume deduces from this 
l ack of necessity a lack or demonstrability and or certitude. 
This view of factual relationships is in turn conditioned by the 
copy theory of ideas, psychological atomism~ and phenomenalism. 
Perhaps the copy theory o·r ideas is unessential. Yet 
it hovers over the whole of Hume's philosophy, and fits in very 
agreeable with an atomistic analysis or experience. If the copy 
theory of ideas was not the reason for Hume1s conclusion concern-
i ng causality, it was certainly the reason for his investigation. 
The original failure to find an impression of necessary connec-
tion prompted Hume to launch on his extensive and indirect 
arguments preparatory to his conclusion concerning the impression 
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of reflectrion or f elt determination. The dictum that ever'y idea 
has a .corresponding impression was the result of empiric induc-
tion and analysis. When Hume encountered an exception to this 
rule, an idea of nece s sary connection without a corresponding 
impression, he could have questioned the value of his original 
induction. However, Hmne pre~erred to maintain his copy theory 
and undertake the indirect search for a corresponding impression. 
Each of these assumptions points to \{hat is crucial 
in Emue's analysis: a thing does not imply another thing, a 
cause doe s not imply an effect, nor an effect, a cause. Hume's 
limi tation of the scope of knowledge eliminates strict certitude 
with regard to matters of fact because it eliminates any neces-
sity in the area of concrete existents . Hence, there is no 
necessary dependence or necessary implication between existents. 
The principle of atomistic sepcreb~lity leads directly to the 
denial of one distinct thing implying another. The ~rinciple of 
, 
the insufficiency of demonstrative reasoning in matters of fact 
renders reason impotent to discover connection or necessary 
implication between facts. The copy theory of ideas, insofar as 
i t supports a perceptual phenomenalism and discrete elements of 
experience, leads to a separability and lack of connection be-
tween things. 
The principle of sufficient reason, or in this 
instance, implication, can be flatl :' denied by anyone. This 
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br ine s phi l os ophy to & stands till. Disputcnt~ on both s i de s then 
proceed to shout the louder: "Yes it is.ft "No it isn't." In 
Hwne's cas e, if not the cause , at least the b&ckground and 
psychologicol conditioner of thi s denial were found to be these 
fa ctors: n Carte s ian vieli of reason, a phenomenalistic view 
of real ity, an atomistic analysis of experience supported by the 
copy t heory of ideas. These factors dovetail and lntercomplement. 
Ea ch of the f actors must· be probed to determine the value of the 
analysis just given. 
CARTESIAN VIEW OF REASON 
With considerable dispatch and few words in the early 
part of the Treatise4 Hume excluded causal inference from the 
sphere of strict demonstration. The exclusion was based on a 
clear and neatly compartmentalized set of definitions according 
to which the relations between ideas are set up as the sole 
subject matter of demonstration. 
This division and consequent exclusion can be j~stifie 
only if there exists a break between intellect and sense, between 
reason and experience. All reasoning must be A priori, indepen-
dent of experience, and not necessarily applicable to the ob3ects 
known through sensation. Mathematical reasoning is here 
considered the prime analogate of all reasoning. Mathematical 
4 A, iii, 1 (69-7J). 
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r ea s oning C e l), proceed regarclle5 ~ of ",-hether the ob jects of the 
mind c&n be realized in experience. Vithout concern for 
es tablishing the historical accuracy of the phrase, the 
"Cartesian" vie"r/ of reason is taken here to mean this overemphasi~ 
of mathematical rea soning, the stress on a pure and autonomous 
reason, operating in independence of experience. 
Hume generalizes and caricatures this rationalist and 
Ca rtesian vie~{ of reason~ then exposes its flimsy nature. Obvi-
ously reason cannot operate in a purely ~ priori fashion, 
penetrating to the intrinsic nature of a thing on the first 
glimpse of its external make-up. Only a self-sufficent and 
independent reason could transcend the patient analysis of 
accidents to decipher immediately the specific traits of the 
sUbstance. But Hume demands of reason precisely such instantan-
5 
eous and definitive grasps of essences. And human reason limps 
away a miserable failure from the tests · to which Hume puts it, 
tests which only a "transcendent" reason could pass. 
In puncturing the rationalist appraisal of reason, 
Hume tends to the opposite pole in emphasizing the primacy of 
6 
sense im ressions. In an important footnote, he rejects the 
artific!aldichotomy between reason and experience and insists 
5 E, IV, i (24, 26, 28); V, i, (36). 
6 E, V, i (38n). 
, 
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on the clos~ interplay of the two. He advocates a close essocia-
tion between the imagination and the understanding. 
Nonetheless, Hume never heals the rationalist rupture 
between intellect and sense. He does not explain the joint 
functioning of diverse cognitive powers in man. Bume retains a 
rela ti vely pure reason in the s'pher.e of ma thema tics and the 
comparison of ideas. Apparently he nowhere explains the value 
of this reason or the way in which it operates. Hlli"1e fails to 
consider what is involved in the discursive comparing activity 
of reason. There are problems involved in our apprehension of 
any relation, in our apprehension of succession, quite as much 
as in the apprehension of causality. 
However, he did completely separate the two types of 
t hinking, analytic and synthetic, to employ the post-Kantian 
terminology. He attends very little to analytic thinking (and 
Kant criticized Hume for what little he did say about mathe-
matics), and he ascribes synthetic thinking largely to the 
imagination. 
Imagination is used here not merely in the sense of 
nfeigning."7 Imagination is employed in a ~pecial sense by 
7 Hume adverts to the fact that he employs imagina-
tion in at least two senses, T, iii, 9 (ll8n): "When I oppose 
the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we 
form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the 
same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative reasonings." 
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Hume to name the vivacity of conception, the fdculty or quality 
"by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others.n8 
Imagination is the faculty proper to belief. The ascribing ot 
primacy to the imagination is a necessary consequence in a 
now king. This leads Hume to say that "causes and effects ~ 
discoverable, not ~ reason, but Rz experlence."9 Reason cannot 
attain actual causes without the help ot experience. But this 
does not show that experience and not reason attains causes. 
I t is still possible that reason cooperating with experience, 
r eason utilizing the data of experience, can attain causes. 
I t is possible that sense data can contain more than the senses 
are capable of interpretIng, and further that it is the preoise 
function of intellect to furth~r the interpretation, to grasp 
t he "meaning," of the data. 
8 ~ iv, 7 (265). 
i magination in Hume are found 
459-463. 
9 ~ IV, i (25). 
Several leads to the meaning ot 
in Smith, PhilosoPhY ~ Dav1d ~, 
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The natural consequence of Hume's view of reason is 
t ha t he is not in a favorable position to understand a conjoint 
operation of intellect and sense, or intelligible operations with 
exi stential bearings. Hwne's reason does not profit by experience 
or the repetition of events. For the experience of similar 
circumstances clarifies the precise conditions which antecede a 
given event as the apparent determinants of that event. Careful 
observation and induction point to the fact that the only reason 
f or the constancy of a certain set of phenomena is this other 
i nvariably concomitant phenomenon. 
But for Hume, reason is not the faculty whose goal is 
i nsight. There is no growth in intelligibilitie~, in the 
dis covery of meanings, no cumulative penetration of the relations 
and implications in our complex world, which is the reward of the 
persevering drive of the intellect. Instead of profiting by the 
accumulation of experience, empirical underst~nding becomes the 
vic tim of custom. Once the cord binding the intellectual and 
sensory powers has been severed, imagination, the faculty proper 
to belief, operates as a mechanical propensity. 
HUME'S THEORY OF IDEAS 
It is a characteristic of Hume's style to repeat key 
ideas frequently throughout his work. The unfortunate fact is 
that the multitude of repetitions lebve the basic idea fundamen-
tally unanalyzed. This is true of Hume's theory of ideas . His 
,. I 
'i 
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exposition rRmains careless and confused. 
The psychology of impressions 2nd idea.s stand at the 
threshold of the Treatise as flume's basic analysis of experience. 
It is unnecessary to go into a detailed presentation of this 
familiar doctrine. Simply put, the components of experience 
are perceptions, which can be subdivided into im.pressions and 
ideas, simple and complex. The basic distinction between I impressions and ideas is the degree of force and liveliness 
together with the constLncy attending these ~erceptionswhich we 
classify as impressions. All ideas are exact copies of impres-
sions, faded out impressions in a sense, and derived from 
'1 Iimpressions. 10 When we are dubious about the meaning of en idea, 
Iwe inquire ITfrom W'h2.t impression is that supposed idea derived?"ll 
This clipped &nalysis led Reid to launch his 
~nvective: "The articles of inquisi tion are 1'el-; indeed but very 
~readful in their conse~uences; Is the prisoner an im~res s ion 
PI' an idea? If an idea, from \-rha t impres s ion copied? ,,12 
I Although it is fashionable to pooh-poeh the &ci~ 
rriticisms of heid, this remc:rk has con s iderable foundation. 
!Phe inc;uisi torial thumbscrews (ire defini tely e;atJ1oyeci.10 T:,-e 
10 T, i, 1 (1,2,4,5); 
55, 232, 231). E, II, (14, 17). 
11 E, II (17). 
i, 2 (in ; ,., - , ~ CC .l..':>U 
12 ThclTlas Rei a , Incuiry Into The Hwr.c.n Mine , VI, 144. 
89 
strict copy-theory is used to bolster the theory of belief. 
With a one to one correspondence between impressions and ideas 
i t is considerably easier to explain the association of impres-
sions and ideas, and the consequent transfusion of force and 
vivacity, of belief-pungency. At the point at which Hume saw 
there 1~as no impression of causation in the objects, there was 
th It ti t ti th th f °d 13 ano er a erna ve, 0 ques on e copy eory 0 ~ ease 
Hum2 apparently does not recant his copy theory, 
t hough the analysis of experience in the early part of the 
Treatise is incomplete. Later the reader is called upon to 
r ecognize objects other than impressions and ideas, objects of 
knowledge and of belief, acts of comparison, propensities of the 
imagination, qualities of human nature. Of course, the modern 
phenomenalist can say that all of these complex objects are 
merely families of sense data. Hume called the objects of belief 
collections of perceptions • . This does not account for the unity 
of the human person, the one person who knows, senses, wills, 
feels. Nor are collections or families of perceptions a satis-
factory account of the unitary beings, trees, cows, birds, which 
we meet in experience. It was this excessively analytic attitude 
13 The precise difficulty is that Hume did not 
merely say, as did the Scholastics, that sensation is the basis 
of all knowledge. Hume insisted that all knowledge be directly 
referable to sense knowledge. According to Hume's handling of 
the problem, sense must contain formally what is in intellect. 
, 
, 
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of the CO PJ'i theory which led. Hum€:: to psycholcg ical atomism. 
The second a spect of the theory of ideas presents 
itself in the form of, a que s tion: Whether the impression is 
representative or not? There are passages which define the 
i mpression as representative14 and other pas sages which clearly 
imply that is is non-representative.15 
16 Hartnack has discovered four dIstinct views of 
impressions in HQ~e: two representative and two of a non-
repres entative standpoint. Hume does not depart from Locke in 
the representative view of impressions. The impression or 
perception is the i~nediate object of knowledge, though there 
is a transcendent object which is the cause of the empirical 
object. 
Of the non-representative standpoints, one is 
characterized by the supposition "that it would be a contradic-
tion to assert the continued existence of the impression; the 
other is characterized on the contrary by the view that such an 
assertion would not be a contradiction, but tha t empirical 
reasons can be fo~~d for believing it to be false.,,17 
639). 
14 T, I, i, 2; I, iv, 2; II" i, 1; Appendix (638-
15 T,I iv, 4 (226); I, iv, 5 (244). 
16 Justus Hartnack, Analysis of the Problem Q( 
Perception in British Empiricism, Copenhagen, 1950, 107-142. 
17 Ibid., 140. 
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"This last view, Hhich Hartnack regards as di:.:;tinct...., 
ively Humean, in asserting that it is logically possible that a 
perception can have a continued existence, equivalently stites 
that a. ~: · erception is not something perceived by a mind. In this 
view mental and material are not used to describe the content of 
an impression. A mind is a cqllection of various perceptions 
just as an object or sUbstance is a bundle of perceptions. 
Being perceived means that there isa relation between the two 
collections of perceptions, "mind" and "external body." Hume 
edges near to the later so-called neutral monism of William 
James and Bertrand Russell. 
Without entering into more detail as to which view 
Hume most consistently espoused, it is clear that his theory of 
ideas provides no ground for believine in the existence of an 
inde pendent world. In any of the views, perceptions are the 
immediate object of knowledge. And though belief may go beyond 
these immediate perception, knowledge never passes beyond the 
frontier into the land of independent existents. The exact 
correspondence of impression and ideas conditioned Hume's 
psychological atomism. The representative and especially the 
non-representative characteristics of the theory of ideas issued 
in phenomenalism. Each of these will now be handled at greater 
length. 
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.. PHENOMENALISM 
No one can doubt, believes Hume, that ..,,re are directly 
aware only of "perceptions." Hwne believed in the existence 
of both n~terial objects and perceptions ~nd thought that per-
ceptions were the appearance of external objects. He was a 
phenomenalist in that he argu~d that we could not lcnow anything 
but perceptions in the restricted sense of certain l~owledge 
unrisked by error. "We may observe ••• that nothing is ever 
really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions 
and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by 
those perceptions they occasion_nIB We cannot rationally !mow 
or infer anything but perceptions, yet we must believe that 
there are material objects. This apparent inconsistency might 
urge the abandonment of the theory of ideas. But H~~e considers 
it established. This is one assumption that an otherwise 
acutely critical philosopher neglected to question. Actually the 
theory was in his favor, the necessary prerequisite for his 
positive beliefs. 
Reality in this phenomenalist context is nothing but 
our name for a particular organization of vivid perceptions. 
In Chapter III it was indicated that generally for Hume, to 
believe is to take something to exist. Hwne is careful to 
insist that existence is not an idea or conceptual content. But 
18 I, ii, 6 (67); also E, XlI, i (125; 126; 127). 
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.. 
while insisting on the identity of content in belief and in 
fiction, Hlli~e sometimes claims that a reference to existence 
is no great distinguishing mark among perceptions: 
To reflect on anything sim~ly, and to reflect on it as 
existent, are nothing different from each other • • • 
Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any 
idea He please to form is the idea of a being;l~nd the 
idea of a being is any idea we please to form. 
This &ttitude obviously breeds difficulties in distinguishing 
between the existence of a thing and our thinking of that thing. 
Brune confuses here two assertions: "1. 'Whatever 
-we think of has the form of a fact.' 2. 'Whatever i-/e think of 
we take to be a fact. ,,,20 Existence may not be a perception 
distinct from all others. But it must be a principle of things 
which, I-1hile eluding conceptualization, is attained in belief 
or judgment. But if existence is just another word for percep-
tion, non-existence must not be a word for anything. Hume must 
mean that in any instance what we attain are perceptions. But 
we can think perceptions which are merely perceptions a.nd He 
do not call them "real things." And we can think perceptions 
which are at once vivid and systematically inter-connected; 
these perceptions we call "real things." 
19 T, ii, 6 (66-67). This section is the most 
insistent statement of the phenomenal role of perceptions. 
20 Passmore, Hume 1 s Intentions, 98. 
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This is Hume's phenomenal 'Horld. One may balk at 
recognizing it &s the world with which ordinary people have 
dealings. Yet it is a world rich with possibilities when it 
comes to the rejection of causality. Without ~ reference to 
independent existence it is quite impossible to explain why 
certain of our perceptions are picked out as sensations, or 
as memories, or as images, or a3 beliefs. Perceptions are 
sometimes alike and sometimes different, that is all. Hume 
arrives at belief in the independently real, not by the 
inference of cause and effect as he asserted in Part iii, but 
through the association of similar perceptions and the smooth 
passage of the imagination over the gaps in perception. A 
certain propensity of the imagination overcomes the feeling of 
uneasiness attendant upon the gaps in perception by producing 
the fiction of continued existents. Since the perception or ~ 
impression is considered continuous, one concludes that it is 
independent. Hence the belief in independent objects. 
Perceptual phenomenalism affects the causality 
arguments mediately through the belief in independent objects. 
The character of cause and effect are attributed to indepen-
dently existing things. Since physical bodies are objects of 
belief, bodies under the aspect of "cause" or "effect" will 
likewise be objects of belief. 
To insist that Hume's theory of ideas leads to 
" 
" 
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pheno~en&li sm bnd thence to the rej ection of objective necessary 
connection i s not to "answer H1.une." HlL.'Ile has othe r argurnents, 
dep ending as much on · the discreteness of particulars as on tne 
"mentality" of perceptions. However, · this does point up the 
intrinsic dialectic of Hume's thought. The theory of ideas 
joins hands with phenomenalism a.nd the two lead to atomism. 
ATOMISM 
y{hatever objects are different are distinguishable, 
and that whatever objects are distinguish~fle are 
separable by the thought and imagination. 
Wherever there is a difference runong experiences, an 
actual sep~ration may occur. Any distinguishable experience may 
be separated without alteration from other experiences with 
which it is conjoined. This seems to imply that any distinguish-
able element in experience is self-identical and self-contained, 
if not self-sufficient. HlL.~e's systems are combinations of 
individ~al elements that appear in association. Association 
itself is somehow a distinguishable constituent and therefore 
separc.bl e, external to its terms. It seems difficult, under 
the force of Hume's dictum, to see how ~erceptions are repeatable 
or that there can be terms without a relation or a relation with-
out terms. 
This is not to imply that experience begins with 
21 T, i, 7 (18). 
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c.. t oaic bloc.lcs to be buil t up into a normal conscious life. 
Nor~al ex pe~ience consists of impressions closely associ~ted 
in syntheses. Hurne's point is that elements can be discerned 
Hithin t he syntheses, and that every element thus se,tJo.rotely 
conceived can exist separately (even though in most instances 
he might concede that it would be a fanciful possibility). 
The factor of implica tion, of causal connection, 
could sca~cely survive the passage through the sieve of atomism. 
A worl d of discrete particulars severs a.ny necessary connections 
betl-Teen things: 
that as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, 
and as t J. le ideas of Cbuse and effect are evidently distinct, 
'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-
existent this moment, and existent the next, without 
conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or produc-
tive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea 
of a cause from that of a beginning of eXistence, is 
plainly possible for the imagination; end consequently 
the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, 
th2t it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is 
therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning 
from mere ideas; without which it is impossible to demon-
strate the necessity of a cause. 22 
It is true that other possible worlds are intellig-
i 
ible. This does not at all whittle away the certitude that this 
world is this. Any matter of fact, any contingent existent, 
Bight be otherwise or might even not be. But there is a con-
22 T, i 'ii, 3 (79-80); iii, 12 (139). 
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seCiuent de'" fc..cto neces s i ty in its imn-,edia te presence. As the 
ol d ~dcge h&3 it, bocr&te s sit s with metaphysical necessity 
while he sit s . lilly actual contingent existen<t .. now in being 
re quires an actual cause for its actual existence. 
Clearly HUIne' s di s cussion hels all the earmarks of 
& confu8i on of the logical with the real world. Completeness 
of de s criptive analysis is equated with existential self-
suffici <? ncy . Hhen iJerceptions are tae only obj e cts of the mind, 
l ogical [C no real possibility become easily co:n.founded. The 
cri t e ria of neces s i ty and immutabili ty, applicc.ble to universal 
essences, are transferred to the ort er ot ~&rticular, concrete 
existents. Since the atomic elements of experience, impressions 
hlld ideas, are loose &nd indep~ndent of each other, they are 
analyzed as similarly isolated in any lIexternal" state of 
existence. Perceptions can enter and l eave consciousness 
without anyone making too great fuss of searching for a cause. 
'vv/}lat seems to be llanting here is something other than 
perception, the act of judgment, which can affirm something 
other than mere perceptions, namely, the act of being. This 
involves the intentional aspect of judgment. But by emphasizing 
t he intentionality involved in the intellect in judgment, it is 
not hereby conceded that the concept is devoid of an intentional 
Ci.spect. KnoHledge can be considered as an ensemble of formal 
determinations, which c9.re the determinations of the thing known, 
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or knowledge can be considered as a relation, an oPPosition 
between subj ect and object. The determinations of the act of 
knowing are always given concretely in relation to the object. 
An essence is al\{ays an essence of something. It is impossible 
for pheno~enological description to prescind sincerely from 
this relative aspect, the ad .aliguid or hoc aliguid, which is 
characteristic of knowledge. The intellect manifests an 
intrinsic dynamic tendency toward being. Though the intentional 
aspect of cognition finds its completion in judgment, it is also 
~ 23 present in the first operation of the mind, apprehension. 
Besides intentionality, what also seems to' be lacking 
in Hume is a notion of relativum: one thing which of its very 
nature has a rapport, a regard for another, such as father-son, 
husband-wife. That two facts are adequately distinct shows only 
that, as far as their intrinsi c nature s taken singly are con-
cerned, it is not apparent that they are inseparable. But if, 
when they are considered in relat ion, one is known to entail 
the other, it follows that they are i nseparable and that the 
thought of their separation implies a contradiction, because it 
implies that a relation which is known to subsis t between them 
does not subsist between them. Thus, i f beginning to be really 
~ 
23 See Joseph de Finance, ~ at Ai1£, PariS, 1945, 
262-263, 280-287. 
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en t a il s b r: in.;; c ,: u sec.: , thE: se ~;<, :::"cc tion ,of t hese f;;,.ctor s Cic' e s in 
f&ct i~91y a contr~ai c t i on. 
This hint!:; G. t another vieW' of the y,orlc..~ iu whict. t,ilere 
are continuities between th~ cause-event and the effect-event. 
' TIley are not "loose," but connectec... , inter' connecteci, &nd related 
in c o~plex ways. The analysi~ cf any di s criminable event In-
volves the desc:'i~tion of other events relevant to it::. OCCllrrE:nCe 
A thing &S a thing may not be connected r.-ith Cincther. One 
bill i ard bellI, or one gear, Can be consi<iered in isolation. But 
a billiard ball Cictually striking another, and a ge;;.r enmeshed 
with another cannot be considered as unrelated with the other. 
The difficulties of the preceding chapter suggested 
that custom or association was not enough to explain our in-
sistence on the necessary connection bet"l-.Teen certain ~)airs of 
conjoine~ objects. There is oper&ting some grasp of logical 
connection, some rational selectivity, some formulation of 
tenta tivE' laws. The following chapter will attempt to present 
a theory of causal implication. First, however, a brief 
evalua.tion of Hu.me' s main aim in philosoElhy is in order. 
Throughout these pages of exposition and critiCism, 
the questioning and inquiring attit~de of Hume has been evident. 
HUl:1e'S philosophy is better ~') resented as a critical or inquiring 
attitt1 C:e. As an exponent of systematic doctrine, Hwne leaves 
much more to be desired. But we can hardly absolve ourselves 
j 
, 
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'" by :!' ,':-!1Ci r Lin,s t Lot his ;;hiloso;;hy i :::. rich in problems U1L! hints. 
llr s t, the re i s one basic factcr at the threshold of 
HU;:le' s philoE:,ophy. Hu:ne 'iuestions the I'unciCi.ment.sl l;rinciple 
t n~ t 2ssurEnc£ ought al~~ys t o rest either on direct awareness 
or on logicGlly cog-ent -:> vi cl. ence. HUIlle y;i shes to insi ~ t the. t a 
181"[.2 nWi~b ,::; r of 11o.n's conv i ctions C're not r8tion&1 and thct a 
iil.2cD can and must be guided by custom or- experience more than 
by rease,n. It is the denial of the above fundamental lJrinci~le 
"-ihich renc.ers Burne's philoso>hy some·w-ha t independent of the 
of the corporeal world. His major concern was to displace the 
trc:.ditionally conceded function of intellect by another avenue 
to reality. Hume Y.~as chiefly interested in his doctrine of 
belief and in the principles of attraction or association. The 
preliminary analysis and critique of causality was devised to 
indic2.te that the instrument of reason was too inadequate to 
grapple with e xistential reality. 
These two contributions or interests of H~~e also 
indicate two major influences. The principle of association 
hearkens back to Newton. Neylton shoy,'ed that the fundamental 
chEmges in the physical Horld could. be explcined by the prln-
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ciple of gravi ta tion. And with gravi ta tion, Ne'rTton could point 
to asscci c; tion as a fact of experience ".;i thout appealing to any 
occult cause. 
Hume applied this doctrine to the knowing processes. 
The fundamental changes in the mental world could be explained 
by the association and attraction of ~erceptions, of impressions 
and ideas. In this way Hume develops a dynamics of the mind by 
which he can give a mechanistic account of mental processes. 
He finds " a kind of ATTRACTION which in the mental world will be 
found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and 
to shew itself in as many and as various forms. n24 
From this G<.nd other passages it is clear that Bume 
considered the principle of association to playa significant 
role in his philosophy: "If anything can entitle the author to 
so glorious a name as that of inventor, it is the use he makes 
of the principle of the association of ideas, which entefs into 
most of his philosophy.n25 
Hume's other major concern, belief, especially under 
the aspect of the dominant role that feeling plays in belief, 
reflects the influence of Hutcheson. Hume asserts that Abelie! 
is ~ properly !as. act of the sensitive, .:t.hm.2.t ~ cogitative 
24 ~ i, 4 (12-13). 
25 Abstract, 32. 
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This indicates Burne's f~~d~rr.ental 
e~]ha2is on feeling or passion in place of reason. 
Tne i-lork of Hutcheson27 maintained the dominant role 
of feeling and passion in moral matters and insisted on the non-
cognitive chLracter of the aesthetic and moral senses. Hurne 
J1imself \,Ti tes of Hutcheson in a note appt:~nded to later ed.i tions 
pf the Enquiry: 
But a late Philosopher Mr. Hutcheson has taught us, 
by the most convincing Arguments, that :'4orality is 
nothing in the abstract Nc.ture of l'hings, but is en-
tiraly r olative to the Sentiment or mental T~ste of each 
particular Being • • • Moral Perceptions, therefore, 
ought not to be class'd with the Operations of th~8 
Understandine, but with the Tastes or Sentiments. 
Hutcheson believed thEtt moral sf-mtiments and judg-
ments are determined for us by nature. We are so constituted by 
nature to judge of good and evil, immediately and involuntarily, 
just as our taste reacts in a determined way to bitter and 
sweet things. 
Norman Kemp Smith suggests the following steps which 
Hume may bave taken because of the influence of Hutcheson: 
26 T, iv, I (183). 
27 The matter on Hutcheson has been derived largely ~rom secondary sources, espeCially Smith, Philosophy of David 
Rume, 23-47. 
28 E, I (IOn). 
," 
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i f the fund~nent~l jUCgment s of morals, ~ s of aes t he t i cs 
res t on f eel ing, n ot on reason; and i f in matter s of ~oral 
COn(luct Natu r e }:'2 S bf.:en thus ca r eful in ;J roviding us, 
inde pendently of all c E l cul ~ tion and reflexion, with ' the s e 
'Lil .'ied iate monit ors', may it not be so likewise in the 
prof ess edly t heore tical fi e ld? May not our so-called 
j udgment s of knch'l edGe in regard to matter s of i'2Ct B.nd 
existence be r eal ly acts of b~lief, not of Imowledge--
belief being a ;;a 85 ion and not a form of insi gilt, o.nd 
t herefore, liLe all pas~;ions , fixed c ..nd .predetermined by 
t he de facto fr ame and constitution of our human nature?29 
The evidence for this contention is suffici ently 
convincing. The positive teaching of Book I of the Treatise does 
reve r se the roles traditionally ascribed to reason and the 
pa s s ions. Theoretical judgments d.o not express an insight into 
a neces sary reletion • . These judgments rather convey a belief 
whi ch rests on feeling or s entiment. 
Ne-I'I-ton and Hutcheson, then, appear as the two major 
influences on Hume's positive teaching. But there remains the 
question of influence as it was traditionally handled by Reid,30 I ' 
Beattie, Huxley, and T. H. Green. These commentators contended 
t hat Hume's te2ching is wholly negative and that it stands as a 
classic reduction to absurdity of the principles of Locke and 
Berl-'~eley • 
29 Smith, Philosophy- of David Hume, 43-44. Smith's 
analysis of the influence of Hutcheson is convincing. However, 
the following statement, that the reversal of the roles played 
by reason and the passions is the most significant and the most 
important element in Hume's philosophy, is open to dispute. 
30 Thomas Reid, Inquiry Into ~ Hyman Mind, I, in 
[Works, 102-103. 
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~ \lithout entering too much into detail, it is clear 
~rom Chapter III of this thesis that Hume1sphilosophy is not 
~holly negative but that Hume had a definite positive contribu-
tion concerning belief and the principles of association which he 
intended to assert. 
However, something can be said for the traditional 
view that Hurne carried the assumptions of Locke and Berkeley 
to a logical conclusion. Prescinding from the question of 
~hether Hume intended to use the theory of ideas for the same 
purposes as his predecessors, the fact remains that he ret~ined 
the theory of ideas. Though otherwise quite critical, Hume did 
loot question this fundamental assumption. Dispensing with the 
shades of difference between Hume and his predecessors, percep-
tions are for him the objects of the mind , and ideas are copies 
of impressions. It has been indicated in this chapter how the 
copy theory of ideas influenced Hume's phenomenalism and his 
psychological atomism. These two viewpoints were in turn the 
basis for the negative criticism of causality. Thus it may be 
concluded that, consciously or unconsciously, Hume is influenced 
by the Lockean tradition in the negative aspect of his philosophy. 
To conclude, positively, Hume was concerned to estab-
lish his theory of belief, based on the primacy of feeling and 
the principle of association. Hutcheson and Newton are the two 
chief influences behind Humets positive contributions. 
1 
l ! 
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Negatively, nume aimed to attack the rationalist or intellectua-
list approach to causality and to the reality of the corporeal 
,{orld. In his negative approach, Hume borrows from elements in 
the Lockean tradition and is therefore influenced by that 
tradition. 
CHAPTER VI 
A POSITIVE THEORY OF CAUSALITY 
The exposition of Hume's basic doctrine &nd the 
accompanying criticism have been completed. But criticism of 
its nature is inevitably negative and therefore leaves a vacuum. 
The purpose of this chapter is to fill the vacuum by presenting 
a positive theory of causality. 
However, since this chapter is of the nature of an 
epilogue, the positive analysis will necessarily assume the form 
of a brief summary. The exposition may fail to satisfy at many 
points for want of detail, but this method is necessary to avoid 
the present analysis from itself developing into the proportions 
of another thesis. As the argumentation proceeds, sources will 
be indicated wherein the matter is treated in greater detail. 
There are at least three steps to be accounted for in 
a positive approach to causality: the origin of the notion of 
cause, the validity of that notion, and finally the knowledge and 
validity of the principle of causality. 
A discussion of the origin of the notion of cause 
calls for psychological or phenomenological analysis. Changes 
106 
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occurrine in t~o. concrete things are the primary experiences 
frOlll ,;hich , it 'Would seem, we derive the notion of causali ty. 
But the imnedib te dE.ta of experience do not merely reveal to us 
things changing, the coming-to-be of things, but also the 
facto rs 1rihi ch bring about change. Thus, for present purposes, 
t",ro broc:.,d ty .'.:·e s of chc,nge can 'be di s tingui shed. There are 
experiences of chE.nge in Hnich only the coming-to-be of the chang-
ing object is known immediately. Examples of this are the 
ap~arent motion of the moon across ' the sky, the beginnings of 
vegetation in the spring, the clouding uiJ of the sky. In these 
instances the agents of the change are not immediately experienced 
We also find within direct experience both the 
changing ~hings and the agents of the change: a hammer smashing 
a nail into a plank, a knife cutting a slice of bread, a man 
chopping down a tree with an axe. 
Instances of this second type of change appear most 
~ruitful as a source of the notion of cause. For granting the 
abstract possibility of garnering the notion of cause from 
l1etaphysical reflective analysis based on changes of the first 
type, it seems much more probable that the notion of production 
or efficiency arises in ordinary eX!lerience only from instances 
Iof change in which the external agents of the change are perceived 
~irectly. 
Such direct experiences as pushing, pulling, being 
. / ~------------~~--~~--------~~L 
----------------------------------------~~, 
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bumped against, feeling a hot fire, experiencing resistance to 
our efforts, willing, thinking, violent collisions and explo~ions­
-these are proposed as the material from which is derived the 
notion of cause. In the above list "internal" and "extern&l" 
expe riences are lumped together. The question i~~edi&tely arises 
in this matter whe ther our not'ion of cause comes more ir£'1!nedi[;.tely 
from internal or external experiences. There is not space here 
to pass final judgment on this debated point. 
However, it appears plausible that the most direct 
experience of cc.usnlity is in those instances of causation in 
which the action and ~)assion involved in prediccunental caus&li ty 
has as one of its terms the human person. Such basic actions 
as pushing or pulling furniture and othe r objects, actions in 
which the person experiences himself as the source of motor 
activity which brings about a change in some external body or 
, in some other rart of his own body, or actions in which the 
person feels his body acted upon by external agents, his attemp-
ted movements blocked or resisted--these causal actions are pro-
posed as the prime source of the notion of Cause or productive 
agent. These experiences are "external" insofar as external 
bodies are involved as agents or patients. The experiences 
are "internal" insofar as the person is involved as agent or 
patient. 
Human experience is. clearly rich in instances of 
~ ________ ~ ________________ ~; ______ ~ __ ~If 
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causal activity. We displace certain objects by pushing them, 
breCiking thEm, bending them. Certain looks or words attract or 
repel other men and animals. These are instE.nces in which men 
are conscious of their active influencing of other things. 
Other things also influence men. Certain things 
hurt us when they are hurled against us. Things resist our 
efforts, are easy or difficult to ~anipulate. Other things 
also act on each other. One billiard ball collides with another 
to set it in motion. A strong wind makes a building sway; a 
tornado demolishes the same building. Cascading water turns a 
"'Theel. Animals are caught in traps. 
These are all banal, everyday experiences. But from 
these, men get the idea of one thing acting upon, producing 
another thing. These may be called primitive experiences of 
causality. Just how primitive the experience of causality is 
can be indicated by relating causality to the first kno'Yiledge 
of external reality. Upon what is based the judgment or asser-
tion of concrete reality independent of the mind? It is 
grounded in the experience of other things acting upon us 
independently of us. It is the immediate experience of being 
resisted by or deter~nined by corporeal beings. This original 
experience of action and passion, in which the concrete thing 
and the human person are the agent and patient, 1s the datum 
upon which is based the existential judgment. The Judgment of 
'J 
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existence is based on an actual instance of causality. 
The causal instances ~hich have been taken as 
primary are largely mechanic&l movements. There are also 
qualitative changes, such as the sowing of a field and the 
appearance of vegetation, the heating of water and its boiling. 
Causality is present in these inst&nces, but it is not experi-
enced i~~edia tely. Its affirmation rests on an inference, which 
presupposes the said notion of causality. 
( 
The qualitative even must be assimilated and inte-
grated into a present impression of causality or mechan~cal 
activity. There are instances of this, such as the purr of the 
automobile motor when one steps on the starter, the sound of an 
electric bell at the ~ressing of the button, the production of 
sound at the striking of a piano, key. In the visual field, a 
parallel would be the lighting up of a bulb at the turn of a 
switch. 
In all these instances the qualitative event is 
as sociated with some mechanical activity on the part of the 
human agent. In this way the qualitative event is assimilated 
to the more prLni ti ve experience of mechanic&.l acti vi ty and 
interaction. l 
1 The priority accorded mechanical movement over 
qualitative change is based on the findings of A. Michotte, 
k Perception De Ita Causc:lit~, Paris, 1946, e~pecially 220-256 • 
. , 
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~uali t u ti ve events iihich are not connectec. -wi th 
mechc.nical ac t i vi ty, such a ~ growt h or t he aP l.' ec...r , .nce of a 
f ieLl of wheat 2ft e r sOHinc , demand interpreta tion and elabora-
t i on en the da ta of experience. These are causal inst&nces in 
which only the coming-to-be of the patient, and not the activity 
of the aG ent, is directly experienced. 
The data of "internal" experience can be put briefly; 
There i s the spontaneous conviction of men that they are the 
masters of their actions, that they have the power to produce 
movements of their limbs, that they can direct the course of 
t he ir thoughts. There are al s o insights which connect the 
experience of an insul t and the consequent anger, the mm-rledge 
that one's grief is due to the death of a loved one. In these 
latter instances, internal experience suggests that not only 
are the cause and effect within experience but that one even 
. 2 
attains to the reason why the cause produced the effect. 
The first few pages of this chapter are deeply 
indebted to Michotte's findings and his analysis of the origin 
of the notion of cause. 
2 A. C. Ewing, "A Defence of Causality," Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, London, XXXIII, 1932-1933, 124-125. 
He writes: "It seems to me that we can see and to some extent 
really understand why an insult should give rise to B.nger, why 
love should lead to grief if the object of one's love die or 
prove unHorthy, why a success should give seme pleasure." 
L-________ ~ ____ ~ __ ~~ ____ ~ ____________ ~~y 
I 
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Maine de Biran de s erves mention at this point. He 
consider:;; t he ~ 0ntil!lent of effort, the characteristic of volun-
t ory movement, to be the primitive fact as an experience-type of 
causality: 
d(:m ~ un rcpport fond&mental simple, ou irrtsoluble en 
t ".'~ l' e Dnes pnenomenlques, ou ~a cause et 'efiet, Ie sujet 
e~ 1e Licde 2ctif, se tIouvent unis indi visi ble:-n.ent dan Ie 
1Ie!!~e sentiment ou la merne percel: tion d' effort (nisus) 
dont l e s muscles soumis ~ 1a volonte sont les organes 
iJropres. C'est de cette impression originelle d'un 
effort que d~rlvent toutes le s idees de force ou de 
cause. 3 
Certainly Maine de Biran, by his careful descril)tion 
of the causal da.ta and by his insistence on the sentiment of 
effort and the experience of resistance, has done much toward 
the refutation of Hume. However, since external action is 
concerned with material objects, it is difficult to determine 
just how far volition is able to affect material objects or the 
movements of limbs. That is why instances in which there is 
physical contact and interaction between the human ~erson and 
concrete things in an action passion relationship are here 
regarded as the experience-type of causality. 
Having indicated the origin of the notion of cause, 
the psychological account must give way to a brief metaphysical 
3 Maine de Biran, Oeuvres choisies de Maine de Biran, 
Edition Montaigne, Paris, 1942, 165. 
, 
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explana tio~ of what is me&nt by efficient cause. In all the 
examples cited the essential character of the agent or the cause 
consisted in productivity, in the maj.cing of a thing by action. 
An efficient cause is a cC.use or !'lrinciplp. which, by action, 
'-. 
produces the being of another. Causality is essentially, then, 
action. It is the actuality of an active potency which is 
productive of a distinct term.4 
Causclity is not just any action. Action is ca.usal 
only a.s the action of an agent ordained to a term as to an effe'ct. 
As yet, it is not clear just what this productive action is. 
Action is an ultimate ca.tegory and can scarcely be adequately 
defined but only pointed to. But it is to be noted that causal 
action is not to be conceived as an emission, a transplantation 
of entity or energy. De Regnon states very clearly that the 
action is not a reality which goes from the cause to the effect. 
This intermediary reality, which is neither in the cause or the 
effect, would be a reality existing in itself, that is, a sub-
stance. 5 
4 This definition of causal action is taken almost 
verbatim from Francis Meehan, Efficient Causality in Aristotle 
and st. Thomas, Washington, D. e., 1940, 207, where he writes 
that causal action is the "actuality of an active potency which 
is productive of a term distinct from itself regardless of 
whether this term is intrinsic or extrinsic to the agent in 
ques tion. • ." 
, 
5 P. de Regnon, Metaphysigues ~ Causes, liv. 3, 
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Jfficient c&usality is distinct from the relation of 
causality, a f&ct which Hlllne did not advert to. The relation 
. resul t s from the action of ceus;:.li ty. But the relo. tion remC>.ins 
eV9n though the causality ceases when the action ceases. The 
relation continues because the action leaves in the cause and 
in the effect a permanent deterrrQnation which is the foundation 
of the relation. Causality belongs more properly then to the 
category of action than to ~lat of relation. 
,Some understanding of what causality is can be h&.d 
from a view of the action-passion correlate and fro~ a grasp 
of the Scholastic dictum, actio est in passo. Although distinct, 
cause and effect are not isolated to the point that transitive 
action of one upon the other becomes unthin1;:able. Rather the 
causal action is precisely that in which the two things, cause 
and effect, are united and distinguished. The union of two 
things is not their fusion, much less their confusion. The 
distinction of two things does not ccnstitute them as two atoms 
or two worlds. Four things can be mentally distinguished in the 
ch. 2, a. 3, Paris, 1886, 195: "LJaction n'e~t pas une r~alit~ 
qui sort, de la cause et qui se propage jusqu'a lleffet; car 
cette realite intermediare~ qui,ne serait ni dans Ii cause ni 
dans l'effet, serait urie realite existant en alle-meme, c'est-
a-dire une sUbstance. Qui oso. jamais soutenir une conception 
aussi grossi~re?" 
The metaphysical account of the notion of cause 
presented here owes much to de Regfton's M~taphysigue, especially 
Livre III, Chapitres II and III. Also considerable help was 
derived from Meehan, EffiCient Causality, especially 170-240. 
, 
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action-passion correlate: the beine of the cause, its acting, 
the reception of i ts influence, 8.nd the being of the effect. 
There are the Qaker and his lmife, the movements of hand and 
knife, the being cut of the bread, and the cut in the bread 
itself. 
Thus the action of.the agent is in the patient. That 
which is done, the becoming, is in the effect. The cutting takes 
place in the bread. Instruction is in the student, not in the 
teacher. The movement, under the aspect of the becoming of the 
effect, is a passion. ~nsofar as it is related to its source, 
the agent, the same movement is an action. Action is the common 
fIlct of cause E.nd effect,6 just as knowledge is the common act 
of }mm{e r and known. 7 
The origin of the notion of cause and the exact 
meaning or value to be attached to the notion have been con-
sidered. Hurne may still ask his question whether one thing 
6 This double aspect, action and paSSion, of the 'one 
movement is succinctly expressed by St. Thomas, In III Phy. 4, 
p. 392 a-b: "Idem est actus moventis et moti: moventis enim 
dicitur inquant~~ aliquid agit, moti autem inquantum patitur; 
sed idem est quod movens agenda causat, et quod motum patiendo 
recipit ••• Idem enim est quod est amovente, ut a causa 
agente, et quod est in mota ut in patiente et recip1ente." 
, 
7 This happy comparison is made by Andre Marc, 
Dialectiaue De L'Aff1rmation, Bruxel1es, 1952, 441-442: "Repre-
nant un langage qui formule la 10i de 1a connaissance, acte 
cornmun du connaissant et du connu, disons que A1 1action est l'acte commun de 1a cause et de 1leffet, Ie meme acte des deux." 
I 
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ac t ually produce s or causes another. This is not yet a ~uestion 
of t he necess ity existing between C2use and effect, but merely 
t he que s tion of whether there are re&l productive agents in the 
.... rorld. 
The simple and direct answer is contained in the 
account of the origin of the 'notion of cause. li'or there are 
instances of activity in the world in which we directly experience 
both the coming-to-be of the patient and the activity of the 
ag en~. We understand that as a matter of fact, prescinding from 
questions of necessity, some things do change in dependence upon 
an agent. This is an i~ediate datum, a datum involved in the 
primary experience of existence. lrJllen we l.::now ourselves as 
eXisting, we experience ourselves as the sources of willing, 
thinking, and acting. When we judge that there is a concrete 
world independent of us, we so judge precisely because this 
I{orld acts upon us causally to determine us to know. 
Some things, then, as a matter of fact change under 
the influence of an agent. But is this necessarily so? This 
raises the question of the validity of the principle of causali-
ty. To phrase the question metaphysically, can a thing pass from 
poWncy to act without the productive activity or some agent? 
One can thus far assert that with consequent necessity 
a given A is the cause of B. One may also assert in an enumera-
tive judgment that all the instances of change in his experience 
, I 
I ) 
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have an age nt or effici ent c[-us e accomFLnying them. In this Wf.'y 
many experience s of causation may generate the notion or a 
general c2u sc=.: 1 lar!. This is close to w!:at Hwne ueant by the work 
of habit and association. But eV 9n though the plurality of 
ins tcmces of caus.stion does suggest the formulation of a general 
law, yet the judgrnent of necessity that there exists a necessary 
connection between cause and effect cannot result from a mere 
smnmation but requires rather a reflective analysis to determine 
the value of this necessary judgment. 
The precise character of this reflective analysis is 
to subsume all effects under the category of ccntingent or 
participated being. Then by reflecting on what it means to be a 
contingent being and what it means to have a cause, one concludes 
that "to have a cause" is of the nature of a "contingent being." 
To say that every contingent being demands a cause is to say that 
the notion of contingent being implies the n<..~ tion of CEi.Use. The 
first step in establishing the principle of causality, then, is 
to indicate the meaning of implication. 
Implication8 is considered as holding between proposi-
tions. This is its use in logic. But ~rorosltions represent 
or indicE.te facts or classes of facts. Thus if proposition A 
8 This explanation of the meaning of implication 
presents in s~~ary fashion the thought elaborated in D. J. B. 
Hawkins, Causality and Implics.tion, London, 1937, 47-48. 
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implies propO'Si tion B, 2.n d lJ rOposi t ion A. re~res ~nts E chb.r2cter 
of t he cla s~ of t hings A hnd ~roposition B indicates a chhracter 
of t ile class of things , B, t hen any instance of A implies B. 
Implic~ tion is as valid a s the ide&s or propositions between 
whi ch it holds. W'n'2n implicd tion holds betw-een factubl proposi-
tions, then it r el a tes t he facts themselves. 
Two conditions for vCilid implication become cl ear. 
The fir s t i s the existence of a ccncrete world independent of the 
mental world of logic~l ~ropo s itions. If the ~ropositions are to 
bear some relation to facts, tr.e3e facts must exist and be 
represented in the propositions. 
Secondly, implication is primc.rily an inten3ional 
relation, as opposed to extensional or enumerative. Singular 
things are conjoined spatially cn6 temporally. The conjunction 
of abstract natures is by the intensional relation of irrtplication. 
Thus the s e cond factor or condition for -valid implication is 
abstr2ction or the ability cf the mind to gra sp the universal 
aspects of things. For implication involves the grasping of the 
characters or attributes of the objects of class A and of class B. 
Then, when a character or attribute of the apprehended nature A is 
seen to demand some attribute of the nature B, a necessary rela-
tion is asserted to exist between A and B. Consequently whenever 
A actually exists, B must also exist, since A cannot be given 
without B. Implication is thus a togetherness of absolute 
I 
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n&ture s . 
In an actua l ins t&nce, inpl i c&tion comes to me~n t his 
An inst2YlCe of .A ' ;ithout B i s conceivcble 11' only A is con-
s i dered . Thlt if B is al s o considered, an instance of A without B 
i s Lilpos s ible. }\n 6 since I--! e are Ci ec..ling here ;;ith un i.versals, 
t he i M~lica t i on is valid for eyery instance of A and B. The 
t e rms be tween which the implic&t ion obt&ins are absolute netures. 
It applie s to s ingulars insofar as these embody the natures. 
An im.plicative proposition, then, is one in which 
on e a bs Glut e nature is as serte c. t o have a ccnjunctive relation 
with another nature. This mu .::: t be distinguished from a proposi-
ti on in which a predic&te is affirmed to belong to a singular 
subj ect, &5 in "This mun is white." The implicative ~roposition 
or implication expresses an if-then relation between the universa 
subject and the universal predicate. 
Implicative propositions may be of two kinds. An 
implication can be contained in a judgment which is merely 
explicative. 1m example of this is the propositicn, "All bodies 
are extended." The predicate, extended, is asserted of the 
subject, bodies, as a part of its meaning and as derived from a 
simple analysis of the meaning of the subject. "What is red is 
colorec., fI and "Every rose is a flower," and "Ev.:;ry colored thing 
is extended," are all examples of this tYfJe of implication which 
which is expressed in an explicative judgment. 
~. 
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But there is also an ampliative judgment which 
provides an extension of lrnowledge in such a way that the 
predic&te cannot be derived from the mere analysis of the subject. 
Both the terms of the implication, both the subject and the 
predicate, must be yresent and KnO\m. Given both the subject 
and the predicate, the i ,redic2.te is found to be implied by the 
intelligible nature of the subject. An example of this is the 
case in point, "Every event has a c&use." 
In either case, whether the i~plicaticn is 6iscovered 
by ~ere analysis of the subject or by the conjcint analysis of 
the subject end predicate, all that is required is th2t the terms 
• 
of the implication be fully and distinctly &pprehended. 
For any Valid implication between facts two things, 
it has been noted, are re~uired, a concrete world independent 
of us and a mind capable of abstraction. A third piece of 
met&physic&l eGuipment is required when there is question of the 
conjoint analysis of the two concepts, "contingeIlt being" and 
TIthing having a cause." This is the principle of sufficient 
reason. As a l_,rinciple of reality, its ta tes that everything 
which is has a ground of its being, "irhether in its own na tu~e 
or outside it. It is also called the principle of Wliversal 
intelligibility. 
Now the questicn is this. Must eveL'y event r..&ve a 
cause, or can a thing come to be Hithout an agent? To examine 
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the matter in its metaphysical context, it is necessary to revert 
to the concepts of act and potency. 
The thing which becomes, before it becomes, cannot 
have that which it acquires. Change is precisely a tendency or 
movement toward act. Act is the term of a l l movement and 
bec oming. Act is the cro~n of ,achievement, the maturity of 
rowth, because movement is the passage from the i mperfect to the 
erfect. Act is thus logicaliy prior to potency. 
Yet there is the apparent antimomy in the real order 
in that, in every instance of becoming, potency chronologically 
precedes act. This antinomy is resolved in that, though potency 
precedes act within this changing thing, this changing thing 
emands an act outside itself which determines it to achieve the 
oerfection to which it is destined. 
This other, this act which determines the changeable 
hing to become, is what is called efficient cause. Applying the 
rinciple of sufficient reason, mobile being has its sufficient 
easen either in itself or in another. It does not have the 
ufficient reason in itself, because then it would give itself 
hat it receives. The changing thing would already have that 
hich it gives itself. The changing thing would already be that 
hich it is becoming and which it precisely shculd not be in 
rder to become. 
It is clearly necessary that it have the sufficient 
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~'ea. son in .s.rfother which is &lre&dy in act. Other,dse potency 
~ould bG prior to act, non-being prier to being, end the more 
Derfect would be explained by the less perfect. Tne principle 
pf contradiction violently opposes all of this. 
From this analysis it is clear that it is the nature 
pf a "thing which comes-to-be" ,that it necessarily "has an 
efficient cause." The intrinsic principles of ch2ngeBble being 
Bre insufficient to explain adequately the change. T11e predicate 
'has an efficient cause" belongs necessar~ly to the subject 
'whatever becomes." 
Every effect, every being that changes, has an 
~fficient cause. This is not the broadest enunciation of the 
.. 
~rinciple. Becoming or change reveals a particular characteristic 
pf. all being that changes. It is contingent, or participated, 
pr limited being. A contingent being is one which can be or 
~ot be. A contingent being does not neces sarily exist, since 
~t does not have the reason for i ts existence in itself. Since 
~ given contingent being is, and s ince it does not have the 
~ufficient reason for its existence in itsel f, it must have i t 
~n another. By comparing the netion of "contingent being" with 
the notion of "that which has a cause" one finds the.t the "other'! 
which contingent being implies is b.n efficient cause. Thus the 
principle of causality can noyr be enuncio.ted in its ,·dder scope: 
W"hatever exists contingently (every partiCipated being) has an 
, 
-
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efficient cause of its existence. 
To conclude by way of summary, the noticn of cause is 
more probably derived from instances of change or causation in 
which both the coming-to-be of the thing changed and the 
activity of the agent bringing about the change are immedi&tely 
experienced. Instances in which there is physj.cal contact end 
interaction between the human person and concrete things in an 
action-passion relationship are regarded as the experience-type 
of causality. Internal experience is equally immediate. Man 
experiences himself as the source of willing, thinking, and 
acting. He experiences resistance to his efforts. 
Secondary instances of causality are experiences of 
qualitative causality which are associated with mechanical 
activity, such as the striking of ·a piano key and the production 
of sound. Also secondary are lnstance~ in which, though both the 
cause and effect are experienced, the person is not involved as 
agent or patient. Finally there are all those instances of 
causality in which only the effect or the change is experienced, 
and which demend an inference to determine that there was a cause 
and what the cause precisely is. 
Metaphysical analysis of the nature supplemented the 
psychological account of the origin of the notion of cause. The 
metaphysical analysis indicated that causality is essentially 
action. Causality is the actuality of an active potency which 
1.24 
is product!ve of a distinct t 8rm. The rcti l' t t· · o on 0 ne ag€n 1S 1n 
t he l:)2tient, s ince the C2.uscl action is the common act of cause 
and eff ec t. 
Thi s led to the question of the necessity expressed 
n the principle of causality. To establish the principle of 
f ~c. usc, 11 ty, the following fa.ctors were involved as prerniEes: 
'( !OrI el of concrete existents independent of the mind, a hwn6.n 
intellect which is cc.pable cf discerning unive:rsal Cl.spects of 
I these concrete existents, the principle of sufficient reason end I 
, ~he fact of implication as obtaining between these concrete 
I existents. 
With surprising exactness these factors correspond, 
by way of opposition, to the ' 1-remises involved in Hume ' .s denial 
of causallty~ In the conclusion to the body of the thesis 
expressed at the end of the last chapter, Hurne's major defi-
ciencies were considered to' be: a phenomenalistic view of the 
object of knowledge, an inaccurate account ot the proper work of 
human reason, and an atomistic analysis of experience. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
_ Javid, An Abstract of A Treatise of Human N~ture, 1740, 
Reprinted with an Introduction by J. M. Keynes and P. 
Sraffa, Cambridge, 1938 • . 
Iume, David, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, edited 
with notes by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols., 
London, 1889. 
krAume, David, Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
edited with an Introduction by Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd 
ed., Edinburgh, 1947. 
1 illue, David, The Letters of Dayid BYm&, edited by ·J. Y. T. 
Greig, 2 vols., Oxford, 1932. . 
~ume, David, A Treatise orauman Nature ~ Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion, edited with an Introduction by T. H. i Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols., London, 1898. 
T·'me .~ David, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-
Bigge, Oxford, 1946. 
II. SECONDARY SOURCES 
A. BOOKS 
iken, Henry D., Kuma's Moral ~ Po11tic~1 PldlosoPbY, lew 
York, 1948. 
iran, Maine de, Oeuvres ChQisies ~ KAine ~ Birtp, Edition 
Montaigne, Paris, 1942. 
hurch, Ralph V., Hume's TheorY ~~ Understanding, London, 
1935. 
125 
126 
I «> Comp2yr e , Gbbri el, L& Philoso uhie de David Hurne, Pc-ris, 1873. 
" Fin2.l1ce , J ose.Jh de, EtI'E et Agir, Paris, 1945., 
ti'onsegrive , G. L., L2. Cause.lite' Efficlente, Paris, 1891. 
l 
' .2. rtnEck, Jus tus , Analysis of the Problem of Perception in 
Br i ti sh Empiricism, Copenhagen, 1950. 
Hawkins , D. J. B., Causality and Implic~tion, London, 1937. 
Hendel, Charle s \.filliam, Studies In the Philosophy of David 
Hrune, Princeton, 1925. 
Huxley, Thomas H.
6
, Hurne With Helps To The Study of Berkeley, 
NeH York, 189 • 
KEnt, Immanuel, Prolegomena to .Any Future MetaphySiCS, edited 
with an Introduction by Lewis W. Beck, New York, 1951. 
Knight, William J., Hume, Blackwood Series, Edinburgh and London, 
~ 
1914. , 
ruse, Fr. Vinding, Hume's Philosophy In ~ Principal ~, 
A Treatise ~f Human Nature, AnQ In ~ Essals, translated 
by P. T. Federspiel, London, 19J9. 
·'1.ypers, Mary Shaw, Studies in the Eighteenth CenturY Background 
Of Hume's Empiricism, Minneapolis, 19JO~ 
I Rachael M., Beason ~ Conduct In Hums's treat1se, London, 
946. 
, , ~, B. M., David Hume, Londor:., 1932. 
aird, J OM, HUDle's Philosophy .Qf. Hu¥n NE.ture, London, 1932. 
I 
alande, .Andre, Vocabulaire Tecbnique et Critique ~ ~ Phi1oso-
phie, 5th ed., PariS, 1947. 
acNabb, D. G. e., David Hume, His Theon 9.l. Knowledge ~ 
Morality, London, 1951. 
, 
arc, Andre, Dialectigue ~ ,L'Affirmation, Bruxel1es, 1952. 
127 
i1Clr ~ C I~Ci l, Jose.(n , ~. J., Lc. Cl'itic ue c.e :;:~c.nt, Vel. III of 
.!.;~_ Pcint [ Ie Depart d. e 1a Metaphysigue, 2nd ec., Pa.ris, 
" 142. 
i , J&Cc;ues, A Preface to Hetaphysics, Loncion, 1939. 
,,, onstance, HUille's Theory of Knmdedge, London, 1937. 
Fr<:,ncis X., Efficient Cause.li ty in Aristotle ~ St. 
:..;:~, \.[ashington, D • . C., 1940. 
t te, A., La Perception De L& CausalitEf, Louvain-Paris, 1946. 
'10m Thomas Verner, Cogni ti ve Psychology, Philadelphia, 
;;39. 
c. B., Locl;:e, Berkeley, ~, Oxford, 1931. 
~~ ~, J. A., Hume's Intentions, Cambridge, 1952. 
d. H., Hums's Theory Qt the External World, Oxford, 1940. 
Th~odore de, La Met~physigye ~ CaUl!!. ~ar1s, 1886. 
' hornas, \forks, Preface and notes by Sir WUli. .. HaJI11ton, 
li'l.nburgh, 1846. . 
lorman Kemp, ~ PhilosoPhY of DaVid ~, London, 1941. 
, I Leslie, English Thought In ~ Eighteenth Centurz, 
ed., 2 vols., London, 1881. 
,.i , Alfred North, Process and Reality, NeH York, 1929. 
B. ARTICLES 
ldrich, 'Virgil C., "Tvo Hundred Years after Sume 8' freatist," 
Journal of PhilosoPhY, New York, XXXVI, October 12, 19)9, 
600-605.-
Beardsley, Monroe C., "A Dilemma for Hume," ~ fh11osoPh1ca1 
Review, New York, III, January, 1943, 28-46. 
128 
"""o ng, L . C., "A Defense ofCausc:lity," Proceecings of the 
r istot e1ian bociety, Lonc!.on, XXXIII, 1932-1933,95-128. 
r t, h. E., "Hw:ne Wi thout Scepticism," Mind, London, XXXIX, 
. ~ly, 193: 0, 273-301; October, 1930, 409-425. 
n , P., "De Origine Primorum Principiorum," Gregorianum, 
, ,rne , XIV, 1933, 153-184. 
And Present Day Problems, A symposium, Proceedings of the 
,~l istote1ian Society, London, Supplementary Vol. XVIII, 
'1 39. 
Jf; , '1.'. E., "Some t1isunderst£ndings of Hume," Revue Interna-
r; ionc.1e de Philosophie, Bruxe1les, VI, No. 20, Fascicule 2, 
_952,155-167. 
1-., B. M., "Great Thinkers: David Hume," Philosophy, London, 
'f~ I , October, 1937, 395-412 • 
. > John, "Concerning Epistemology," Proceedings Qt the 
Ar istotelian Society, London, XXX, 1930, 1-30. 
, 1, John, "Hume's Account of Sensitive Be1iet," M1nd, London, 
"LVIII, October, 1939, 427-445. 
ti , John, "Impressions and Ideas: a Note on Hwne," lU.w1, 
T.ondon, LII, April, 1943, 171-177. 
iJ C. A., "Hume's Doctrine of Causality," pr~Ceed1ngS .Qf.. ~ 
~ristotelian Society, London, XXXI!, 1931-1 32~ )01-328. 
bb, D. G. C., "Hume on Induction," Revue ~ternat1o~le 
Philosophie, Bruxe11es, VI, No. 20, Fas~cule 2, ~2, 
.4,-198. 
d, Constance, "On the Nature and Significance of Bume's 
,Scepticism, Revue Internationale ~ Phi1osophie, Bruxelles, 
tI , No. 20, Fascicule 2, 1952, 168-183. 
Mossier, Ernest C., "The Enigma of Hume,"~, London, XLV, July 
1936, 3.34-.349. 
Price, H. H., "The Permanent Significance or Hume's Philosophy," 
Philosophy, London, XV, January, 1940, 7-37. 
--- ' ------------------~~ ----------~~---------
........ ..;;.....:.:...;; ______ r" _~_ 
129 
• 
hn K., "Aquinas and Hurne on the Laws of Association" 
•. ~ Scholasticism, Washington, XII, 1938, 366-377. 
ski, Alexander, S. J., "De Principio Causalitatis 
m dum Doctrinam S. Thomae, n A£1!.~. ACademiae 
-m!.!. ~ ~mae A9..... 11 Religion1s Catholicae, V, 
lot , 130-1 2. 
J. B., "David Rume and William James: A Comparison," 
! na1 Qt the History ~ Ideas, New York, XIII, October, 
'" 514-527. 
'~Torman Kemp, "Inaugural Address," Proceedings of the 
;d tote11ap Society, London, Supplementary Volume 
' I I, 1939, xx1-~ • 
... - '- --
APPROVAL SHEET 
Donald Edward Ryan,S.J. 
has been re a d and appro~ed by three membe r s 0f the 
:Jepartment of Philes0phy . 
11h 8 :;:'inal ,,~ Iyp i e s have b ee n examined b ,Y t he di l' -
~ ctor of the thesis an d ~h e signature wh i ch a ppears 
b~low ve r ii i e~ ~he fact tha t any neces sary Jhanges 
,'1C:i.V80e e n inc () r :po rate (i , a nd that~he thes i s i s n ow 
~ i v e n fi n '1, :_ '3" p pro val wit h :c e f er e n (; e t 0 co n ten t , 
/ orm , anrl 'n8 :; hani cal '3,(; curac y. 
T h e~ h e s i ;'; :_ ;3 +, her e I ' (H ' e accepted i n parti al 
Date 
(j(~ P rliQ/u/~ <; . Q 
Signatur e o f Adviser , 
May 1, 1955 
